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Abstract 
 
It has been ten years since the signature of the NAFTA agreement among Canada, U.S., 
and Mexico. For Mexico, this was a decisive step away from a protectionism model 
toward a free trade market. One of the main purposes for Mexico in joining NAFTA was 
to increase the competitiveness of its manufacturing sector, especially the automotive 
industry. 
 
In this paper, Porter’s Diamond Model of national competitiveness and some critiques 
that attempt to extend the usefulness of the model are analyzed. The Doubled Diamond 
and the role of MNEs in a host country are both examined through a case study research 
of the foreign-owned automobile industry in Mexico.  
The findings of this study show evidence of a broader role of MNEs than in the original 
framework, as well as the usefulness of the doubled diamond extension to explain 
alternative sources of competitiveness in early stages of development. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Ten years ago, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed among 
Canada, United States of America, and Mexico, with the promise of the three partners 
jointly accessing a huge market of 350 million people. 
 
From the Mexican perspective, NAFTA represented the continuation of the aperture 
process that started with the incorporation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in 1986 (Secretaria de Economia, 2004). 
 
After years of a closed Mexican economy, in which the government restricted the 
presence of foreign companies or products in order to protect domestic firms, the 
liberalization of the trade has allowed Mexico to pursue the opportunity to access its 
northern neighbour markets, acquire new technologies from developed countries, support 
and improve the competitiveness of its indigenous industries, and attract foreign direct 
investment for the creation of new jobs.  Many firms have prospered and numerous 
industries have become more successful. 
 
But despite all these potential advantages, the opening of its borders has also meant that 
some Mexican companies and industries have suffered from the competitive pressure 
exerted by foreign firms with better capabilities such as lower cost or better 
differentiators that add value for the Mexican customers. So after ten years of NAFTA, 
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there remain unanswered questions about its impact on the overall national 
competitiveness of Mexico itself. 
The study of national competitiveness is complex but Porter (1990) has proposed the 
Diamond Model to assess the sources of competitive advantages of an entire industry in a 
particular country. As an offshoot of this theory, his identification of the “clustering” 
phenomenon of cooperation and competition among related industries in a country has 
also been heralded as a source of international competitiveness.  
 
In an effort to understand the competitive success of the automobile industry in Mexico, 
post-NAFTA, the Diamond Model has been applied to this industry, which is by most 
measures internationally competitive. The period of study for the industry is 1993 to 2003 
providing an appraisal of “ten years after NAFTA”.  
 
The specific contributions of this study are twofold: 1) the analysis of a Mexican industry 
within NAFTA gives some insight into the use of the Doubled Diamond1 (Rugman and 
D’Cruz, 1993) as an extension of the basic Diamond Model and 2) the use of the 
automobile industry in Mexico gives an opportunity to examine the critiques of the role 
of Multinational Enterprises in Porter’s model (Clancy, O’Malley, O’Connell, and Van 
Egeraat; 2001; Oz, 2002, Dunning, 1993; Rugman and Verbeke, 1993). 
 
In addition to its contribution to theory testing and extension, this study hopes to inform 
the applicability of the Porter’s amended framework as a tool for policymakers, 
                                                 
1 The Doubled Diamond refers to situations wherein some aspects of a nation’s competitiveness are 
impacted by conditions in a major trading partner. For example, many Canadian and Mexican industries 
benefit from the sophisticated demand characteristics of U.S. consumers. 
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managers, and industry associations to strengthen the competitiveness of Mexican 
industries. 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. The Diamond Model Theory 
It is important to recognize that when the Diamond Model was proposed by Porter 
(1990), it represented a substantially different paradigm to assess the competitiveness of a 
country. The previous theories, Absolute Advantage Theory (Smith, 1776) and the 
Comparative Advantage Theory (Ricardo, 1817) focused on each country’s factors of 
production: land, labour cost, capital, and natural resources. According to Adam Smith, 
the wealth of nations was determined by the total output of production, given specific 
resources. As modified by Ricardo, the opportunity cost of resource deployment, not 
simple productivity, would determine the advantage for one country in comparison with 
another. In either case, however, a country was seen to be more competitive than another 
based fundamentally on the factors of production or endowments it enjoyed. 
 
The problem is that when this theory found support in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century, only lower skills were necessary for competition. In those days, natural 
resources and factors of production were the main source of competitive advantages 
(Porter, 1990, 13). However, as increased technological innovation and globalization of 
the markets have taken place, theories based primarily on factor endowments can not 
explain either the success of some countries that lack natural resources, or the poor 
performance of countries that have enormous natural endowments.  
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 Porter (1990) argues that productivity is the main factor for international competitiveness 
and that the standard of living of a country’s population can be improved as a direct result 
of increases in that factor (p.6).  Productivity relies on increasing workers’ skills, 
developing technologies, producing quality products, and reducing costs. 
 
At the national level, productivity can be increased when the industries in a particular 
country “upgrade” themselves to improve efficiencies (Porter, 1990, p.6).  For instance, 
an increase in technology can boost productivity and at the same time, can facilitate the 
production of differentiated products with much added value for customers. By doing so, 
industries can compete in more sophisticated and international markets. But in order to 
maintain or improve this position, an industry requires a continual upgrading process. 
 
Porter (1990) explains that a country should focus on some industries that can be highly 
successful, because it is not possible to be highly competitive in every industry. To lay 
the theoretical underpinnings of this interplay of country and industry competitiveness 
issues, Porter (1990) developed The Diamond Model which consists of four national 
determinants of competitive advantage in a particular industry: (1) factor conditions, (2) 
demand conditions, (3) related and supporting industries, and (4) firm’s strategy, 
structure and rivalry (p.71). These four sources of competitive advantage can produce a 
fertile soil to build an internationally competitive industry in a country. In other words, 
some industries, in a particular country, have strong diamonds, while others have weak 
ones. In addition to these four determinants of competitiveness, there are two indirect 
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variables in the model: (5) chance and (6) government (Porter, 1990, p.124-128). The 
“Diamond Model” is shown in Fig.1 following: 
 
Figure 1: The “Diamond Model” 
 
FACTOR 
CONDITIONS 
RELATED AND 
SUPPORTING 
INDUSTRIES 
DEMAND 
CONDITIONS 
FIRM STRATEGY, 
STRUCTURE, AND 
RIVALRY 
    Government 
     Chance  
Source: Adapted from Porter, M.E. The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York: Free Press, 1990.  
 
The six variables of the Diamond are explained here: 
 
Factor conditions are the factors of production and infrastructure necessary to 
compete in a particular industry. They include the labour skills and natural resources 
that in early stages of development can provide an advantage. Porter (1998) 
distinguishes between basic and advanced factors (p. 76-86). The first factors are 
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related to natural resources and endowments, abundant cheap labour, and geographic 
location, among others. The second ones are created by the nation such as a base of 
skilled workers, high tech infrastructure, research and development in institutions and 
universities, among others. In general, it is expected that the second ones will provide 
a more sustainable source of competitive advantage than the first. 
 
Demand conditions are the pressures based on buyers’ requirements about quality, 
price, and services in a particular industry. This will prepare the industry to compete 
internationally in future stages. For instance, Japanese car buyers exert pressure on 
Japanese car makers with regard to high quality standards forcing them to improve 
the quality of their products, processes, and practices, which in turn prepares the 
entire industry to compete internationally. 
 
Related and supporting industries are the networks of suppliers and distributors that 
cooperate with the industry to support it in international competition. This is 
especially the case where these supporting networks already compete internationally 
themselves. It is difficult to compete if the industry does not have access to networks 
that both reduce costs through efficient supply chain management and produce raw 
materials and components of high quality. Vertical integration is an alternative but 
this is rarely feasible across an entire industry. 
 
Firm strategy, structure and rivalry capture the robustness of domestic competition. 
Whether an industry is highly competitive domestically will influence the increase in 
 6 
 
productivity needed to compete internationally. In some Latin American countries, 
for example, where a tolerance for monopoly practices and a closed economy exist, it 
is common to find the presence of very few competitors which undermines the 
possibility of high quality standards and efficient production. 
 
The Role of Chance is the likelihood that external events such as war and natural 
disasters can affect or benefit a country or industry, but these events are entirely out 
of the control of the governments or managers within the industries. For instance, the 
heightened border security, resulting from the September 11 terrorist attacks on the 
US undermined import traffic volumes from Mexico, which has had a large impact on 
Mexican exporters.  
 
The Role of Government, all the policies and regulations made by policymakers at all 
levels of government (but particularly federal) can benefit or adversely affect the 
competency of a country and an industry. A paternalistic government that protects 
indigenous firms from foreign firms is not encouraging increases in productivity or 
quality. Thus, when the free market does take place, these firms are not prepared for 
that challenge. On the other hand, a government that is working to reduce 
bureaucratic red tape and facilitate the process of opening a new business will 
encourage the entrepreneurial spirit. Similarly, government encouragement of joint 
ventures with foreign firms will facilitate the transfer of technology. In the Mexican 
case, the support of NAFTA has been a set of international policies to boost the 
competitiveness of Mexican industries. 
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Another important insight about Porter’s Model is the presence of “clusters” around 
competitive industries. Particular industry clusters can be located in countries, regions 
within countries, and zones within regions. They are formed by networks established 
among companies, suppliers, service providers, supporting industries and associations 
(universities, trade associations, cooperative associations) (Porter, 1998). 
 
These clusters of industries provide an enormous support because they build strong 
capabilities that later will develop competitive advantages to compete around the world 
(p73). In Italy, for example, leather fashion makers have the support of competitive 
related industries such as: leather factories, shoe designers, textile fashion cluster, athletic 
footwear, injection moulds, and others (Porter, 1998).The most interesting thing is that 
these firms compete against each other, but they also cooperate within the cluster.  
 
Porter (1990) explains that within the cluster there are horizontal and vertical 
relationships. The former are between similar firms and the latter exist across the supply 
chain. These relationships help individual firms reduce costs through pooled purchasing 
and more efficient supply chain management, but also enhance innovation, sometimes 
through pre-competitive collaboration on product design issues.  Pouder and St John 
(1996) and Bell (2005) find out that firms inside the cluster innovate in greater levels 
than the ones outside the cluster. Porter and Stern (2001) argue that related industries 
concentrated in geographical regions improve the innovation process. 
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The networks established within the cluster also increase communication (Podolny and 
Page, 1998; Porter, 1998). This flow of communication among firms nurtures the 
learning process (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996) and creates knowledge 
(Maskell, 2001).  
 
Finally, Porter’s model (1990) argues that only internationally competitive indigenous 
industries can increase country productivity and country competitive advantage (p. 678). 
Indigenous industries are more preferable than foreign owned MNEs, as the latter usually 
choose the host country for reasons of either lower cost of production, access to natural 
resources, or access to the market, thereby only providing a temporary economic 
development to the host country.  There is also the accompanying risk that an MNE can 
easily shift its location to another country that offers better cost, better natural resources 
or less competitive markets. 
 
Therefore, according to the model, foreign owned MNEs play a small role in the process 
of economic development in the host country. As noted above, when MNEs are located in 
a developing country, it is not common that the strategic decisions of the MNE take place 
there and advanced benefits for the host country such as technology transfer to other 
indigenous industries are less likely. In other words, MNEs in a host country usually 
perform assembly activities that do not require advanced technology, skilled workers, or 
collaborative high tech projects with indigenous industries. Only in the early stages of 
development are they expected to be a source of competitive advantage (Porter, 1990, 
p.679) because MNEs bring some technology to the host country, employment, and some 
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requirements to local authorities with respect to infrastructure conditions that are useful 
for other industries. However if a foreign owned MNE chooses the host country to set 
such core decisions as R&D, production of sophisticated components or strategic 
decisions, then it is possible that they will transfer knowledge, technology and skills to 
indigenous industries.  But according to Porter’s arguments, a foreign owned assembly 
factory, established in the host country, will rarely develop skilled workers and rarely 
transfer know-how to other indigenous industries. 
 
In an application of Porter (1990) to the competitiveness of Canadian industries, Porter 
and the Monitor Company (1991) made clear that there are three MNE motivations to 
invest in a foreign country: 1) Factor sourcing, 2) Market access, and 3) Host country as a 
base of innovation. The first one, described above, focuses on basic factors or 
endowments; the second, looks to avoid tariff and non-tariff barriers; and the third one, 
the most important, occurs only when MNEs shift the home base to the host base in order 
to take advantage of technological advancements, scientific progress, designing expertise, 
among others. 
 
2.2. Critiques of Porter’s Model 
The Diamond Model has attracted some praise for its insights across levels of analysis. 
According to Grant (1991) Porter has built “a bridge between strategic management and 
international economics” because economists usually study a country as a whole with 
macroeconomic indicators such as: GDP, interest rate, inflation rate, while strategic 
management or international management scholars study firms, managers, and national 
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cultures. The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990) focuses on clusters or industries 
as the unit of analysis, but at the end these industries are the actors that promote the 
country competitiveness. 
 
At the same time, there have been some suggested adjustments to the model. In this 
study, two basic critiques regarding Porter’s model are examined: 1) the “doubled 
diamond” as contrasted with the single national diamond posited by Porter (Rugman and 
D’Cruz, 1993) and 2) the role of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) as empowering 
developing countries rather than constraining their growth (Dunning, 1993; Rugman and 
D’Cruz, 1993; Clancy, O’Mally, O’Conell, and Van Egeraat, 2001; O’Mally and 
O’Conell, 2001; Oz, 2002). 
 
2.2.1. The Doubled Diamond vs. a Single National Diamond 
In Porter’s work (1990), it is suggested that to be internationally competitive, it is 
necessary to have a strong national diamond or strong “home base”. Some scholars have 
argued that many small economies that have opened to international trade do not have 
strong national diamonds (Rugman and D’Cruz, 1993). Instead, they have at least one 
weak corner of the national diamond that requires reliance on the corner of a foreign 
diamond. For instance, Canada does not have strong demand conditions in its national 
diamond, but it has strong and sophisticated foreign demand from the US diamond 
(Rugman and D’Cruz, 1993). This argument suggests that in some countries the diamond 
model of a particular industry is linked to the diamond of another country in terms of one 
of the determinants (Rugman and D’Cruz, 1993). These authors go on to explain how 
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globalization has given rise to the phenomenon that the determinants of the 
competitiveness of some countries are complemented by other countries.  
 
In Cartwright’s work (1993) it is argued that some countries have ‘multiple linked 
diamonds’ such as New Zealand. In that country, the dairy industry successfully exports 
to more than 100 countries although their national diamond is weak or moderately weak 
in at least three of the determinants. Thus, the New Zealand dairy industry relies on 
sources of competitiveness that come from diamonds different than its own. Some 
developing countries also have diamonds linked to another country’s diamond. The case 
of Mexico is discussed by Hodgetts (1993).   
 
As a cross-over between the two proposed additions to Porter’s work, Dunning, J.H. 
(1993) explains that MNEs activities have sometimes been decisive in regional 
integration among countries. In his view, MNEs have additional motives to invest in a 
country, different than merely having access to new markets or securing natural 
resources. Dunning work’s (1993) suggests internationalizing Porter’s framework, in 
which it is necessary to analyze not only the determinants of the national diamond, but 
also those from other countries. 
 
2.2.2. The Role of the Multinational Enterprises (MNE’s) as Empowering   
Developing Countries rather than Constraining their Growth  
As discussed above, in Porter’s work (1990), MNEs are expected to play a limited role in 
the development of the host country as a temporary source of competitiveness for the host 
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country in its early development. Porter considered the best (although rare) scenario for 
the host country to be when MNEs shifted their home base to the host base due to 
strategic reasons such as technology access, scientific advancement, expertise.  
 
Accordingly, some studies argue that MNEs play an important role in developing 
countries. Rugman and Verbeke (1993) offer a broader explanation of MNEs’ activities 
that begins by explaining that many MNEs source their strategic advantages from 
different countries as no one country offers all of them. In addition, their work reinforces 
Dunning’s (1993) idea of regional integration, in which MNEs uses several diamonds to 
strengthen their home diamond.  
 
In two studies by D’Cruz (1986) and Fleck and D’Cruz (1987) (cited in Rugman and 
Verbeke, 1993) the authors present another type of MNE configured as a ‘global 
rationalized operation’ that invests in a host country to supply part of a supply chain that 
exists world wide. Such companies often have vertically integrated operations located in 
several different countries, even though core decision making remains in the home 
country.  
 
Dunning (1988) distinguished three categories of MNE operations in foreign countries: 1) 
resource seeking, 2) market seeking, and 3) efficiency seeking. The first two categories 
are similar to those proposed by Porter and Monitor (1991), but in the third one, Dunning 
(1988) explains that efficiency seeking is about international production where supply 
management is a key role. The distinction is that efficiency seeking looks exclusively for 
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global production integration or operational optimization, while Porter’s (1990) home-
base shifting to a host-base country is looking for strategic core decision making and the 
creation of know-how, within the new country. In other words, both positions rely on 
different sources of advantages. In the first one, the importance is the production 
efficiency, while in the second one there is a search for more sophisticated sources of 
advantage such as market segmentation expertise and research and development. 
 
The efficiency-seeking stage of Dunning (1988), share some of the characteristics 
mentioned by Rugman and Verbeke (1993), Dunning (1993), D’Cruz (1986), and Fleck 
and D’Cruz (1987). Among all these points of view the variant is whether the host 
country produces only one part of the supply chain world wide or the entire product for 
the countries that belongs to the regional bloc. 
 
Based on Dunning (1988), the research programme of the Unit on Investment and 
Corporate Strategies of the Division of Production, Productivity and Management of 
ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), developed a 
framework to analyze Transnational Corporations’ (TNCs) corporate strategies to invest 
in Latin America (Mortimore, 2000; Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), 2004). In this framework, the efficiency seeking category is 
expanded and a category called Technological-asset-seeking is added. The expanded 
efficiency seeking category includes the ability to take advantage of international trade 
agreements to have access to export markets from the host country in which there is a 
balance between quality and costs on infrastructure, human resources, and local suppliers.  
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The added strategy takes seriously the more speculative option contemplated by Porter 
and Monitor Company (1991) and Rugman and Verbeke (1993) of shifting the home base 
to a host country. 
 
A summary of these MNE strategies to invest in a host country is shown in table 1. 
Table 1: Summary of MNEs Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Strategies to Invest in a 
               Host Country 
 
MNEs FDI 
strategy 
Author/year Main 
motivations 
Core decisions 
1) Market access 
(market-seeking) 
Dunning (1998); Porter (1990, 
1991);  ECLAC(2004); Rugman 
& Verbeke (1993) 
Avoid tariff & non-
tariff barriers 
Home base 
2) Factor sourcing 
(resource-seeking) 
Dunning (1998); Porter (1990, 
1991);  ECLAC(2004); Rugman 
& Verbeke (1993) 
Access to natural 
resources. Basic 
factors. 
Home base 
3a) Efficiency-seeking Dunning (1998); ECLAC(2004) Access to export 
markets. Quality & 
cost HR. 
Infrastructure. 
Local suppliers. 
Production of parts 
or final product 
Home base 
3b) Bloc/ regional 
integration 
Dunning (1993); Rugman & 
Verbeke (1993) 
Each country 
diamond 
strengthens the 
home diamond. 
Production of the 
final product. 
Home/host 
countries in the 
bloc 
3c) Globally 
rationalized operations 
D’Cruz (1986), and Fleck 
and D’Cruz (1987) (cited in 
Rugman and Verbeke, 1993) 
Supply part of the 
total supply chain. 
Production of a part 
of the final product 
Home/several host 
countries 
4) Shifted to a host 
country(Technological-
asset-seeking) 
Porter (1990, 1991);  Rugman & 
Verbeke (1993); 
ECLAC(2004) 
Technology & 
expertise, R&D,  
Host base 
 
In addition, three empirical studies found discrepancies with the original framework 
regard the role of MNEs. Clancy, O’Malley, O’Connell, and Van Egeraat (2001) found 
that the indigenous Irish software industry is supplied by predominantly foreign-owned 
supporting industries. This surprising considering that O’Malley and O’Gorman (2001), 
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presenting evidence of the international competitiveness of nations in this industry, found 
Ireland to be the world’s second largest exporter of software products. In both studies the 
findings are that the presence of MNEs since 1980s has helped to nurture the indigenous 
industries, especially the supporting industries. In other words, the continuity in FDI in 
this industry has promoted the creation of a competitive cluster. 
 
Oz (2002) conducted another empirical work, this time of the auto industry in Turkey 
which is dominated by foreign-owned firms. He found that the diamond model was 
useful to explain the relative success of this industry, but he also found that the exclusion 
of indigenous firms from this exclusively foreign-owned industry didn’t leave space for 
the Turkish entrepreneurial spirit that initially launched the sector. 
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3. Research Setting: Why Use Mexico to Study Porter’s Diamond? 
Mexico is ideally suited to explore the critiques of Porter’s model discussed above: First, 
NAFTA can reinforce the framework of doubled Diamond, as an extension of the 
Diamond Model. Almost 85% of Mexican exports go to the U.S. (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 2004). In general, FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) of the U.S. in Mexico 
also shows a dependency on the US with that country accounting for 64.3% of the total 
FDI in Mexico in 2003 (Secretaria de Economia, 2004). This is an important point in this 
study. Understanding the extent of the dependent relationship that Mexico has with the 
U.S. can help to assess both Porter’s model and the doubled diamond.  
 
Second, the U.S. has an interest in developing the automobile industry in both Mexico 
and in Canada as part of the NAFTA regional economic block. In that respect, U.S. 
MNEs have been interested in investing in Mexico for more than 10 years. This also 
makes the study of the automobile industry in Mexico an excellent location to evaluate 
the role of Multinational Enterprises in Porter’s model.  In the case of the automobile 
industry in Mexico, there is a majority presence of foreign-owned MNEs. This industry is 
also probably the most successful one after 10 years of NAFTA (Vega & De la Mora, 
2003, p.175). Therefore, studying this industry could provide good insights into whether 
or not MNEs bring technology and competitiveness to the host country. Finally, the 
exploration of the auto industry offers an analysis to determine MNEs’ motivations to 
invest in Mexico. 
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There are also new challenges that Mexican industries must face in the second decade of 
NAFTA as countries like China gather their economic strength and begin to threaten 
Mexico’s markets. Thus, through the analysis of Porter’s model, as well as the two 
critiques discussed before, the study will also hope to provide a better understanding of 
this tool as a means for policymakers, managers, research institutes, and trade 
associations to increase industry competitiveness. 
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4. Research Questions 
 
In summary, the research questions that this study will address are: 
1) Does the doubled diamond better explain the competitiveness of the automobile 
industry in Mexico after ten years of NAFTA in comparison to Porter’s single 
diamond? 
2) Has the presence of MNEs in Mexico, in the automobile assemblers and auto 
parts sector, provided an increase in the national competitiveness of that industry 
after ten years of NAFTA? 
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5. Methodology 
 
A case study of the automobile industry in Mexico has been developed. The case study 
method is useful when it is important to study a phenomenon in context and there are 
many variables to explore (Yin, 2003). The development of this industry has been within 
the economic and political context of Mexico as it has transitioned from a protectionist 
model to a free trade market. 
 
A single case study is recommended when it is a critical case to test a theory and when it 
is important to do a longitudinal case, in which at least two points in time have been 
analyzed (Yin, 2003). The case of the automobile industry is critical due to its value to 
Mexico. This industry is high tech oriented, requires skilled labour and well developed 
supporting industries. Finally, it has a history of 50 years in Mexico. All of these factors 
are characteristic of a broader role for MNEs in the host country, as discussed above. A 
purely labour intensive industry would be closer to what Porter defines as sourcing 
factors or market access, while a high tech industry shows a range of possibilities from 
assembly activities (assuming some advanced machinery gains despite low level labour 
content) to more strategic, high value-added activities such as research and development. 
Further, the two points in time analyzed are: 1993 (pre-NAFTA) and 2003 (10 years post-
NAFTA). The NAFTA agreement was intended to give rise to policies that would foster 
the indigenous auto parts industries and the regional integration of the entire industry 
among Canada, U.S., and Mexico. What evidence exists that this has, in fact, taken 
place?  
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 First, to explore the diamond framework, doubled diamond extension, and the 
motivations of MNEs in choosing Mexico as a host country, this study has analyzed the 
entire auto industry in Mexico. Meanwhile, to get a finer grained understanding of the 
benefits of the presence of MNEs, the study has focused just on the Volkswagen (VW) 
automobile cluster in the Puebla State of Mexico. This cluster is important because it 
represents a crucial case: As one of the earliest entrants, VW has a presence of 50 years 
in Mexico and VW has higher levels of local purchasing compared with many other car 
assemblers. Thus, it was expected that if evidence of benefit from the presence of MNEs 
exists, then it would be found in the VW cluster. 
 
The case study has been developed based on information from two main sources: 1) 
archival sources (United Nations Statistic Division- COMTRADE data base, industry 
reports and industry magazines, industry association information, NAFTA documents, 
academic journals, and government studies) and 2) interviews with managers and 
representatives of firms within the VW cluster in Puebla. 
 
The archival data and interviews were used to: 1) Position the international 
competitiveness of the industry, 2) Identify the sources of competitiveness for the 
industry, Diamond Model and Doubled Diamond extension (research questions 1 and 2), 
and 3) Examine the role of MNEs as promoting national competitiveness (research 
question 2).  
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5.1. Positioning the International Competitiveness of the Industry 
 
The trends of several indicators of international competitiveness were analyzed from 
1993 (pre-NAFTA) to 2003 (post-NAFTA). According to Porter (1990), the indicators of 
the international competitiveness of an industry are: 1) Sustainable increase in exports to 
the world, 2) Increase in world share exports, as a proxy of market share, in a particular 
industry, 3) Foreign Direct Investment in that industry, 4) Trade balance in that industry, 
and 5) Proportion of exports in that industry with respect to the total exports of the 
country in a particular year (p.739-744).  
 
The first indicator of the international competitiveness of the auto industry in Mexico was 
is the auto industry’s contribution to the total exports of Mexico. To derive this indicator, 
the following approach was used: First, the top exporting industries in Mexico were listed 
from the maximum export value to the minimum. Then, the automobile industry was 
compared with all the industries that accounted for the top 50% of the total Mexican 
exports in both periods of time: 1993 and 2003. The purpose of this was to see how the 
auto industry has been evolving in terms of its contribution to the total exports of Mexico.  
 
Some scholars have critiqued exports as a measurement of international competitiveness, 
but as Oz (1999) has argued, exports are the best proxy of international competitiveness 
that we have so far and the method of arriving at these measurements have remained 
consistent throughout a significant period of time (p. 42). 
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As a second approach to determining international competitive indicators for the 
automobile and auto parts industries, archival data from the COMTRADE data base of 
the United Nations was used. To extract the data for each industry, the Industrial Trade 
Classification (SITC) Revision 3 was used. This version is more current and detailed than 
the version SITC Revision 2 used in the analysis of the countries in The Competitive 
Advantage of Nations (1990, p743).  
 
This Industrial Classification allows an analysis to reach into increasing detail as 
required: industry, sub-industry, sub-sub-industry. The majority of the analysis of export 
value was conducted at 3-digit SITC level with cases at the 4-digit SITC level.  
  
5.2. Addressing the Research Questions 
In order to assess both research questions, it was necessary to collect in-depth 
information about the automobile industry in Mexico. But for the second research 
question, it also was necessary to analyze the automobile cluster of VW, in particular to 
establish details about their development of indigenous suppliers. This information was 
gathered as described below: 
 
Archival Data: 
Several documents about the automobile industry were analyzed (see Appendix 1) in 
order to find sources of competitiveness according to: 1) Porter’s Diamond Model and 
the Doubled diamond extension theory, 2) the presence of indigenous suppliers in the 
auto parts industry, and 3) MNEs’ motivations to invest in the automobile industry in 
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Mexico. All of the documents in Appendix 1 were categorized by source into six types: 
Company reports, Government reports, Industry association reports, specialized 
magazines, Non Government Organization reports, and research reported in academic 
journals and books. These sources were reviewed carefully to identify possible biases, 
common agreements, and inconsistencies.  All of the important facts were archived in a 
data base as a source of reference. 
 
During the analysis of the archival data, there was general agreement on some issues and 
inconsistencies in others.  An attempt was made to resolve inconsistencies by identifying 
the more authoritative source and by seeking additional sources. In general, the main 
problems in this regard appeared in the distinction between the development of an 
indigenous industry and a local industry. This point is relevant for the theory in question. 
An indigenous industry is generally characterized by local ownership (Mexican), whereas 
a local industry can have either local ownership or, as in the case of local content rules, 
be foreign-owned. In the case of the development of a local industry in which the 
majority of the capital is of foreign origin, this slippage in what constitutes ‘local’ 
represents a serious problem according to Porter’s (1990) conception of MNEs as 
explained above. Due to its substantial policy implications, I return to the discussion of 
‘local’ suppliers in the paper’s concluding remarks.  
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Interviews: 
Interviews were employed as supplementary source of information. They helped to fill in 
details about the supply chain around the Volkswagen car assembler and the development 
of its indigenous suppliers. The interviews were also used as a check on the accuracy of 
archival information given the self interest of both government and industry to portray 
NAFTA as a generally positive influence.   
 
An email “invitation to participate” in a telephone interview was sent to the companies 
established within the Volkswagen Cluster in the State of Puebla, Mexico. (See Email in 
appendix 2.) The companies related to the automobile industry were selected from the list 
of companies that appear in the website of “The Economic Development Secretariat of 
the State of Puebla (SEDECO Puebla)” - section “Industrial Parks”: 
http://www.sedeco.pue.gob.mx/infraestructura/seapi/index.htm.   
 
A “Formal Letter” in which the research protocol is explained was provided as an 
attachment to the email. (See Formal letter in Appendix 3.) 
 
An “Interview guide” was developed as a semi-structured questionnaire, according to 
Patton, M.Q. (2002). (See Interview guide in Appendix 4.) This guide features both 
general questions about the automobile industry and specific questions about the 
Volkswagen cluster in Puebla. 
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The email invitation, the formal letter, and the interview guide were written in English, 
then translated into Spanish, and a 3rd person then translated them back again into English 
to avoid translation problems. The email and the formal letter were then sent in Spanish 
to more than 65 companies. The interviews were conducted in Spanish, even though the 
option was extended to conduct them in English. 
 
The author conducted the telephone interviews while he took written notes about the 
answers. Subsequently, all the interview notes were transcribed to computer files and 
analyzed. 
 
The analysis of these interviews focused on: 1) the impact of the NAFTA in the auto 
parts industry, 2) the characteristics of the suppliers hierarchy in the auto industry, 3) the 
level of technological development of the company, and 4) finding evidence of the 
development of indigenous suppliers as a result of the presence of MNEs in the cluster 
VW in Puebla.  In all cases, the emphasis was both on verifying information from 
archival sources and on surfacing new insights into the relationships between VW and its 
suppliers.  
 
Some problems were encountered in identifying the appropriate email contact 
information for the interviews as on many company websites the Mexican operations did 
not have their own public relations people but were linked directly to Public Relations in 
a headquarters office in another country. In total, 65 emails were sent of which 15 
respondents agreed to participate in the interview. However, only 6 interviews were able 
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to be conducted due to timing problems, with some managers being on vacation, or 
appointments for interviews being postponed several times. In other cases, replies were 
from the company’s Public Relations Office indicating that they were forwarding the 
original email to other areas, but these areas did not respond.  
 
One explanation of this low response is that the topic of suppliers’ development may be a 
difficult topic to talk about, especially when the majority of Tier 1 suppliers import a 
great part of their requirements and the information request might easily have been seen 
to be biased toward indigenous suppliers. Also, it is possible that some companies did not 
want to reveal “strategic” information related to their supply chain. These possibilities 
came to mind when the researcher, upon calling some companies as a follow up, would 
receive what seemed to be evasive reasons to not cooperate in the study including the 
impossibility of sharing such information, or that a person was not the right one to answer 
these kinds of questions despite repeated referrals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 27 
 
6. Results 
 
6.1. The Competitiveness of the Automobile Industry in Mexico 
The automobile industry in Mexico has a special importance for the competitiveness of 
the country. This industry relies on high technology compared with other successful 
sectors that primarily rely on natural resources and/or labour intensive work. The high 
tech nature of the auto industry helps to promote the industrialization of the country in 
terms of its transportation and power grid infrastructures, growth in its semi-skilled and 
skilled labour force, increasing productivity, and the development of other related 
industries such as machinery and automation.  
 
According to Porter’s (1990) arguments noted above, resource based industries do not 
produce high levels of value added if they only focus on a comparative advantage 
steaming from natural resources. Such was the case in Mexico’s economy only 25 years 
ago. 
 
According to Valdes (2002: p. 70), in the period 1981-83, Mexico's exports were 
concentrated on crude oil and gas that accounted for 72% of total exports, while 
manufactured exports contributed only 19% to the total. But by 1998, manufactured 
exports represented 90.2%, while the contribution of oil was reduced to 6.1%. The fact 
that the contribution of this sector had rebounded to 10.2% by 2003 only serves to 
underscore the point that a resource sector concentration does not help to create a stable 
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economy since the success of any primary extraction industry like the petroleum industry 
is always subject to commodity price variations.  
 
According to ECLAC (2004), Mexico changed its export profile from a resource-based 
orientation to a manufacturing orientation (78.3%) in 2001. The accompanying leap of 
auto industry exports was from 3.9% of total exports in 1985 to 18.4% in 2001 (ECLAC, 
2004). 
 
In addition to its contributions noted above,  the auto industry is also the main 
manufacturing employer in Mexico providing jobs for 12% of the total manufacturing 
work force in 2002 (Vega and De la Mora, 2003, p.175) rising to 19.8% in 2004 
(Industria Nacional de Autopartes (INA), 2004). 
 
6.2. Positioning the Industry as Internationally Competitive 
Currently, Mexico is the 8th largest producer of cars in the world (Instituto de 
Investigaciones Legislativas del Senado de la Republica (IILSEN), 2003). In 2000, 
Mexico was the world's tenth largest automobile exporter (Vega and De la Mora, 2003, 
p.175) with a specialization in the production of small and midsize cars, light trucks, and 
auto parts (p.176).  
 
Following Porter (1990), this study examined in detail the proxies for world 
competitiveness of the main exporter industries and sub-industries and, to appreciate the 
change after 10 years of NAFTA, did so at two points in time: 1993 and 2003. The 
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proxies examined were: Share of Total World Exports, Share of Total Mexican Exports, 
Balance Trade and/or Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In Tables 2 and 3 (Top Mexican 
Industries in Terms of Export Value, 1993 and 2003, respectively), we can appreciate that 
exports of cars (SITC 7812), auto parts (SITC 784), and light trucks (SITC 7821) were in 
the top 10 export industries in Mexico in 1993 rising to the top 3 by 2003. These tables 
show the twenty two industries at the 3-digit and 4-digit level that account for almost 
50% of the total Mexican exports. Table 4 provides a summary of 1993 => 2003 
comparative information. 
 
In 1993, cars, auto parts, and light trucks accounted for 13.4% of total Mexican exports, 
while in 2003 they represented 15.8%. In addition, these three industries increased their 
share of total world exports from 2.3%, 2.4%, and 1.9%, respectively in 1993 to 2.7%, 
3.9%, and 9.8% in 2003. 
 
From 1993 to 2003, cars, auto parts, and light trucks gained 0.4%, 1.5%, and 7.9% 
respectively in Share of Total World Exports. Even though the Petroleum industry gained 
1.7% points, the export value of the auto sub-industries increased more than the resource-
based industry (table 4). After the petroleum industry, cars, auto parts, and light trucks 
were the industries with the next highest export value of the total Mexican exports. 
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Table 2: Top Mexican Industries in Terms of Export Value, 1993 
Code Description
Share of 
Total World 
Exports
Export Value 
($000)
Import Value 
($000)
Balance Trade 
($000)
Share of Total 
Mexican 
Exports
Export 
RANK
333  PETROLEUM OILS, CRUDE 5.8% 6,485,314 0 6,485,314 12.5% 1
7812  MOTOR VEHICLES-Cars 2.3% 4,242,481 393,865 3,848,616 8.2% 2
773  ELECTRIC DISTRIBT.EQPT 13.5% 2,779,688 1,745,784 1,033,904 5.4% 3
784  MOTOR VEHICLES.-Auto Parts 2.4% 2,013,789 905,054 1,108,735 3.9% 4
778  ELECTRIC MACH.APPART. 3.9% 2,008,824 1,931,746 77,078 3.9% 5
772  ELECTRIC SWITCH.RELAY.CIRCUT 3.3% 1,465,697 1,976,657 -510,960 
-1,112,677 
-1,578,716 
-55,396 
-49,972 
-82,849 
-53,350 
-24,245 
-107,440 
-97,997 
-166,955 
2.8% 6
771  ELECTRIC POWER MACHNY.PARTS 5.3% 765,533 486,834 278,699 1.5% 7
893  ARTICLES OF PLASTICS 2.4% 725,146 1,837,823 1.4% 8
776  TRANSISTORS,VALVES,ETC. 0.7% 671,103 2,249,819 1.3% 9
7821  MOTOR VEHICLES-Light Trucks 1.9% 669,201 105,375 563,826 1.3% 10
775  ELECTRODOMESTIC EQUIPMET 2.3% 551,060 375,242 175,818 1.1% 11
898  MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS,ETC. 1.9% 448,207 503,603 0.9% 12
894  BABY CARRIAGE,TOYS,GAMES 1.3% 423,358 418,830 4,528 0.8% 13
1123  BEER made from malt 5.9% 196,459 19,826 176,633 0.4% 14
895  OFFICE,STATIONERY SUPPLS 2.2% 117,500 167,472 0.2% 15
899  MISC MANUFCTRD GOODS 0.7% 114,919 197,768 0.2% 16
786  MOTOR VEHCLS.-TRAILERS 1.7% 110,683 106,337 4,346 0.2% 17
1124  SPIRITS (Liquor) 0.8% 76,578 129,928 0.15% 18
897  GOLD,SILVERWARE,JEWL 0.4% 59,009 83,254 0.11% 19
774  ELECTRO-MEDCL,XRAY EQUIP 0.5% 50,669 158,109 0.10% 20
785  MOTOR VEHCLS-MOTORCYCLES 0.2% 36,984 134,981 0.07% 21
783  MOTOR VEHCLS-Tranport of more than 
10 persons
0.1% 9,942 176,897 0.02% 22
Subtotal Exports 2.8% 24,022,492 46.3%
Total Exports 1.5% 51,886,416 100.0%
Source : Based on United Nations Statistics Division Data, retrieved November 30, 2004 from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/
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Table 3: Top Mexican Industries in Terms of Export Value, 2003
Code Description
Share of 
Total 
World 
Export Value 
($000)
Import Value 
($000)
Balance Trade 
($000)
Share of 
Total 
Mexican 
Export 
RANK
333  PETROLEUM OILS, CRUDE 7.4% 16,826,535 0 16,826,535 10.2% 1
7812  MOTOR VEHICLES-Cars 2.7% 12,546,164 5,749,500 6,796,664 7.6% 2
784  MOTOR VEHICLES.-Auto Parts 3.9% 7,009,162 9,187,190 -2,178,028
-1,936,757
-7,636,586
-3,401,492
4.2% 3
7821  MOTOR VEHICLES-Light 
Trucks 9.8% 6,638,888 1,615,209 5,023,680 4.0% 4
778  ELECTRIC MACH.APPART. 5.7% 6,191,388 4,441,662 1,749,726 3.7% 5
773  ELECTR DISTRIBT.EQPT 14.0% 6,137,050 2,911,045 3,226,005 3.7% 6
772  ELECTRIC 
SWITCH.RELAY.CIRCUT 5.0% 5,181,057 7,117,814 3.1% 7
776  TRANSISTORS,VALVES,ETC. 0.7% 2,172,209 9,808,795 1.3% 8
771  ELECTRIC POWER 
MACHNY.PARTS
5.5% 1,943,390 1,686,614 256,776 1.2% 9
893  ARTICLES,,OF PLASTICS 2.8% 1,801,365 5,202,857 1.1% 10
775  ELECTRODOMESTIC 
EQUIPMET 3.4% 1,649,344 664,358 984,986 1.0% 11
1123  BEER made from malt 18.2% 1,210,114 66,522 1,143,592 0.7% 12
783  MOTOR VEHCLS-Tranport of 
more than 10 persons 3.3% 677,824 94,636 583,188 0.4% 13
894  BABY 
CARRIAGE,TOYS,GAMES
1.3% 653,442 816,555 0.4% 14
898  MUSICAL 
INSTRUMENTS,ETC. 1.6% 625,050 758,155 0.4% 15
1124  SPIRITS (Liquor) 4.4% 592,532 115,224 477,308 0.4% 16
899  MISC MANUFCTRD GOODS 1.4% 455,238 458,125 0.3% 17
897  GOLD,SILVERWARE,JEWL 1.4% 382,055 294,714 87,341 0.2% 18
895  OFFICE,STATIONERY SUPPLS 3.7% 329,543 362,955 0.2% 19
786  MOTOR VEHCLS.-TRAILERS 2.1% 314,760 228,895 85,864 0.2% 20
774  ELECTRO-MEDCL,XRAY 
EQUIP 1.2% 249,029 314,467 0.2% 21
785  MOTOR VEHCLS- 
MOTORCYCLES 0.3% 72,428 252,190 0.0% 22
Subtotal Exports 4.0% 73,662,506 44.5%
Total Exports 2.3% 165,394,545 100.0%
Source : Based on United Nations Statistics Division Data, retrieved November 30, 2004 from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/
-163,114
-133,106
-2,887
-33,413
-65,438
-179,762
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 Table 4: Top Mexican Industry Exporters, 2003 
1993 2003
 PETROLEUM OILS, 
CRUDE 1 1 1.7% 159%
 MOTOR VEHICLES-Cars 
SITC 7812 2 2 0.4% 196%
 MOTOR VEHICLES.-Auto 
Parts SITC 784 4 3 1.5% 248%
 MOTOR VEHICLES-Light 
Trucks SITC 7821 10 4 7.9% 892%
Source : Author's calculations based on Table 2 and 3.
Rank - Export Value of Total Mexican 
Exports
Description
Gain in Share of Total 
World Exports= 
ShTWE'93 - ShTWE'03
Increase in Export 
Value (%)= 
EV'03/EV'93-1x100
 
As shown in Fig.2 below, the trend of Share of Total World Exports for the three 
automobile sector sub-industries gives good evidence of NAFTA’s benefits. 
Figure 2: Mexico's Share of Total World Exports 
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Source : Based on United Nations Statistics Division Data. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/ (Data on Appendix 5)
Pre-NAFTA Post-NAFTA
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It is also interesting to see that only the auto parts sub-industry changed its balance of 
trade from positive to negative in that period, while the cars and light trucks sub-
industries have increased their positive balance of trade (Table 2 and 3). That means that 
Mexico is importing more auto parts and components than it is exporting them. In Fig. 3 
(Auto parts Balance Trade Mexico-World) it is thus noticeable that before NAFTA 
(1994), the Mexican auto parts industry had a positive trade balance, but 10 years after 
the Free Trade Agreement this value has turned negative despite the increase of 248% in 
the export value of this sub-industry. In table 5, complementary information about the 
percentage of change of the Mexican Balance Trade of Auto parts over the years is 
presented. Here it can be seen that despite improvements in the balance of trade 
beginning in 2001, imports have exceeded exports since early in NAFTA. 
 
This is perhaps consistent with the relocation of assembly facilities into Mexico which 
might previously have been located outside but also suggests a large component of 
foreign parts sourcing for Mexican assembly. This point will be discussed further in the 
section on related and supporting industries; however, due to this negative balance trade 
it is important that we analyze the FDI in the auto parts sector as a proxy of 
competitiveness. 
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 Figure 3: Auto parts Balance Trade Mexico –World 
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Source : Based on United Nations Statistics Division Data. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/ (Data on Appendix 6)  
 
Table 5: Auto parts Balance Trade Mexico-World and Percent Change 
 
($000 U.S. Dollars)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Exports 1,602,837 2,013,789 2,307,452 2,498,895 2,976,077 3,462,085 4,173,733 5,107,855 5,812,523 5,579,812 6,608,496 7,009,162
Imports 832,661 905,054 1,342,970 3,103,870 5,578,850 6,638,303 6,660,193 7,908,128 10,335,113 10,068,454 9,813,118 9,187,190
Balance 
Trade 770,176 1,108,735 964,482 -604,975 -2,602,774 -3,176,219 -2,486,460 -2,800,273 -4,522,590 -4,488,643 -3,204,622 -2,178,028
% change 
previous 
year/1
 - 44% -13% -163% -330% -22% 22% -13% -62% 1% 29% 32%
Source : Based on United Nations Statistics Division Data. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/
 /1 A positive"+" sign means that Mexico is gaining points in Trade Balance, while a negative "-" suggests a losing.
 
 
Tracking FDI through a long period of time can serve as a proxy indicating that an 
industry is competitive. However, some countries attract FDI due to their cheap labour 
and/or the ability to avoid tariff barriers. In the case of Mexico, the first reason is partially 
true, because even though the auto industry requires skilled workers such as technicians 
and engineers, they can still be paid at lower levels than in developed countries. On the 
second point, as NAFTA will reduce to zero tariff and non-tariff barriers among the 
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partners to the agreement in a phase out of 10 years, it is also feasible that FDI is seeking 
market access.  
 
In Table 6, it is shown that the Auto industry received $ 9.39 billion US dollars from 
1999 to 2004 of which 62% was directed to the Auto parts industry. 
 
Table 6: Foreign Direct Investment per Activity, in the Automotive Industry (1999-
2004) 
(millions of US dollars)
Total Part.
1999-2004 2/ %
Assembly Industry 
(Cars & buses)
1,380.4 460.4 115.3 335.0 160.2 1,148.7 3,600.0 38.3%
Autoparts Industry: 802.2 1,147.9 1,287.8 872.2 810.6 869.4 5,790.1 61.7%
Other autoparts & 
accessories
672.6 820.8 1,111.6 776.6 737.6 743.4 4,862.6 51.8%
Suspension Systems -0.6 204.1 27.1 38.0 25.6 82.9 376.9 4.0%
Motors & parts 73.7 98.6 32.5 34.9 18.8 11.7 270.1 2.9%
Transmissions 37.6 2.2 8.8 10.8 17.8 24.6 101.8 1.1%
Brakes Systems 17.7 16.2 38.3 9.1 10.9 6.9 99.0 1.1%
Auto bodies 1.3 6.0 69.5 2.8 0.0 0.0 79.6 0.8%
Total 2,182.6 1,608.3 1,403.1 1,207.2 970.8 2,018.1 9,390.0 100.00%
1/January-December, 2004
2/ Notification on December 31, 2004.
Source:  Department of Foreign Investment of the Ministry of the Economy Mexico: http://www.economia.gob.mx/
2002 2003 2004 1/Activity 1999 2000 2001
 
 
Returning to the three sub-industries, in the next three tables the international position of 
each of these sub-industries is shown in terms of export value compared to the world’s 
leading exporters. In Table 7, Mexico’s car exports grew 195.7% after ten years of 
NAFTA. Such growth exceeded the world’s growth. The only country that had a more 
outstanding growth than Mexico was the Republic of Korea. Mexico maintained its 10th 
place as a car exporter. 
 
 36 
 
Table 7: Top Exporters of Cars: Rank Export Value and Growth 1993-2003 
Rank 
Export 
Value 
1993
Rank 
Export 
Value 
2003
Country Share World 
Gain/Lose %
Export Growth %
2 1 Germany 0.8% 158.1%
1 2 Japan -10.6% 44.9%
3 3 Canada -3.5% 63.9%
6 4 France -0.1% 144.9%
5 5 Belgium -2.4% 71.6%
7 6 Spain -0.3% 132.5%
4 7 USA -3.1% 51.0%
8 8
United 
Kingdom 0.5% 184.4%
11 9 Rep. of Korea 1.7% 351.5%
10 10 Mexico 0.4% 195.7%
9 11 Italy -0.7% 74.9%
Total World: 148%
Source: Author's calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division Data, retrieved June 
15, 2005 from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/  (Detail on Appendix 7)  
 
In Table 8, the outstanding performance of Mexico in exporting Light Trucks is shown 
with 892.1% of growth after ten years. This performance shifted its position from 
eleventh to fifth place while gaining a 7.6% share of Total World Exports.  
 
Finally, in Table 9, the auto parts sub-industry shifted its place from ninth to eighth with 
an increase in exports of 248.1%, again exceeding the world growth. Only Spain had a 
greater increase of 293.1%. Also of interest, as noted above, was that despite this increase 
and the auto parts industry gaining a 1.5% share of World Exports, it remains necessary 
for the auto industry in Mexico to import a greater quantity for the car assemblers and 
auto parts than it exports. 
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Table 8: Top Exporters of Light Trucks: Rank Export Value and Growth 1993-2003 
Rank 
Export 
Value 
1993
Rank 
Export 
Value 
2003
Country Share World 
Gain/Lose %
Export Growth %
2 1 Canada -9.7% 19.1%
3 2 USA 0.8% 123.1%
4 3 Germany 1.8% 149.5%
1 4 Japan -17.0% -25.1%
11 5 Mexico 7.6% 892.1%
8 6 France 2.0% 228.7%
10 7 Spain 3.1% 417.9%
6 8 Italy 0.9% 157.2%
9 9 Belgium 1.2% 193.5%
Total World: 106.3%
Source: Author's calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division Data, retrieved June 
15, 2005 from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/ (Detail on Appendix 9)  
 
Table 9: Top Exporters of Auto parts: Rank Export Value and Growth 1993-2003 
Rank 
Export 
Value 
1993
Rank 
Export 
Value 
2003
Country Share World 
Gain/Lose %
Export Growth %
1 1 USA -8.1% 43.7%
4 2 Germany 4.9% 230.1%
2 3 Japan -7.3% 31.8%
3 4 France -1.8% 77.8%
5 5 Canada -1.7% 73.8%
6 6 Italy 0.8% 153.2%
8 7 Spain 2.2% 293.1%
9 8 Mexico 1.5% 248.1%
7 9
United 
Kingdom -0.5% 92.1%
Total World: 117.4%
Source: Author's calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division Data, retrieved June 
15, 2005 from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/ (Detail on Appendix 9)  
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In the analysis of tables 7, 8, and 9 it is important to clarify that these position changes 
are important for Mexico, given its minimal outward FDI, but may be more ambiguous 
for other countries that have substantial outward FDI to other countries. For instance, 
Japan lost its position as the #1 exporter of light trucks (table 8), but it does not mean that 
its competitiveness declined. Behind these figures is the fact that Japan changed its global 
strategy of exporting light trucks to the U.S. to investing in the U.S. to manufacture its 
vehicles there.  
 
In conclusion, Mexican performance in the three auto industry sectors outpaced world 
export growth placing Mexico in the top ten exporters from 1993 to 2003. According to 
the Mexican Secretaria de Economia (2004), only two industries in Mexico had higher 
annual average growth over the period 1993-2003: Electric & Electronic and Textile & 
Apparel. For the future, the electronics and auto industries clearly promise more value 
added and high tech. On the other hand, the textile and apparel industry are easily 
characterized as labour intensive, that despite their annual growth in the last decade, 
could easily see a lot of foreign-owned factories closed as operations are shifted to China. 
 
6.3. Using Porter’s Diamond to Assess Sources of Competitive Advantage in the 
Automobile Industry in Mexico: 1993-2003. 
6.3.1. Factor Conditions 
Initially, the factors that made Mexico interesting to automotive MNEs were cheap raw 
materials and labour, skilled workers with weaker unions than in the U.S., less stringent 
environmental regulations and market access to the U.S. and Latin America (IILSEN, 
 39 
 
2003). The majority of these motivations can be reduced to basic factors, with exception 
of the base of skilled-workers. Mexico also has a comparative advantage in the steel 
industry over countries such as Brazil, Taiwan, and Korea that is reflected in the price of 
raw materials being from 15 to 30% cheaper (Centro de Capital Intelectual y 
Competitividad (CECIC), 2002). For these reasons, automotive MNEs have benefited 
substantially from Mexican factor conditions as the industry developed.  
 
As Mexico entered into freer trade, market forces saw the preparation of an industrial 
infrastructure developed in the import substitution industrialization period that benefited 
the manufacturing sector (Middlebrook and Zepeda, 2003, p.20).  In addition, the 
continuity of FDI in Mexico has allowed continuous improvement in the industrial 
infrastructure. The total FDI in the period 1994 to 2004 has been US$148,472 million, 
49% of which went to manufacturing industries with 9% overall going to the automobile 
industry, i.e. $73,116 and $13, 656 millions of US dollars respectively. (Table 10) 
   
As a result of the FDI, Mexico’s labour productivity and efficiency have greatly 
improved. In the 80's the productivity grew 3.3% per year, and from 1990 to 2001 it grew 
5.8% per year (Ramirez De la O, 2002).  
 
 
Esquivel and Rodriguez-Lopez (2003) found that the gap between skilled and unskilled 
workers has decreased from pre-NAFTA to post-NAFTA, but that the decrease in the gap 
was due largely to technological progress. In other words, there has been an increase in 
wages in this industry post-NAFTA due to increasing technology sophistication. 
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Table 10: Foreign Direct Investment: Manufacture and Automobile Industry in 
Mexico 
(millions of US dollars)
Period Total(1)
Manufacture 
Industry(1)
Automotive 
Industry(2)
% FDI 
Manufacturer 
Industry
% FDI 
Total
1994 10,661.30 6,207.20 N.A. N.A. N.A.
1995 8,345.00 4,858.20 N.A. N.A. N.A.
1996 7,836.30 4,814.90 N.A. N.A. N.A.
1997 12,199.70 7,294.70 N.A. N.A. N.A.
1998 8,359.30 5,158.10 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Total 1994-1998 47,401.60 28,333.10 4266.14(4) 15.1% 9%(3)
1999 13,336.90 9,014.00 2,183 24% 16%
2000 16,909.60 9,539.90 1,608 17% 10%
2001 27,720.80 6,087.00 1,403 23% 5%
2002 15,325.20 6,525.10 1,207 19% 8%
2003 11,663.60 5,205.50 971 19% 8%
2004 16,115.10 8,411.50 2,018 24% 13%
Total 1999-2004 101,071.20 44,783.00 9,390.05 21% 9%
Total 1994-2004(4) 148,472.80 73,116.10 13,656.19 19% 9%
(4) Source : Author calculations
(1) Source :National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Information Mexico (INEGI): www.inegi.gob.mx 
(3) Source : Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (2000). Foreign Investment in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 1999 Report. Santiago, Chile: Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of 
Production, Productivity and Management
(2) Source :Department of Foreign Investment of the Ministry of the Economy Mexico: http://www.economia.gob.mx/ 
(from 1999 to 2004)
 
 
The productivity in the terminal industry (car assembly) had grown 220% by 2003, if we 
take 1993 as a base (INEGI, 2005). By 2003, the average salary in this industry was 29% 
higher than the national average due to higher levels of qualification and specialization 
(Secretaria de Negociaciones Comerciales Internacionales (SNCI) (2004).   
 
The impact on wages and salaries in the auto industry in Mexico is another way to 
examine spill-over effects of MNE participation. In table 11, the annual average 
remunerations in the auto assembly, auto parts, and manufacturing industries are shown 
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in inflation-adjusted constant pesos.  As is the case in the U.S. and Canada, average 
remuneration in the auto industry tends to be higher than the overall manufacturing 
industry average, but it is important to note that while auto assembly wages are more than 
twice the industry average, auto parts industry wages are only marginally greater.  
 
This discrepancy within the auto industry reflects two things: first, the auto industry has 
higher levels of automation and productivity than the auto parts industry yielding greater 
profits to be shared with workers; second, the trend to outsourcing by the car assemblers 
has resulted in workers within the auto parts industry being largely unrepresented by 
collective bargaining. Thus there is limited evidence of substantial spill-over in terms of 
wage prosperity. Wages are generally high for those who work directly for the MNEs, but 
wages of suppliers are not significantly higher than the manufacturing industry average.  
 
 
Table 11: Annual Average Remuneration in the Auto Assembly, Auto Parts, and 
Manufacturing Industries, in Mexico (1994-2003) 
 
(In Constant Mexican Pesos)
Industry 1994 /3 1995 /1 1996 /1 1997 /1 1998 /2 1999 /2 2000 /2 2001 /2 2002 /2 2003 /2
Manufacture 
Industry 26,722 20,644 19,846 20,583 20,699 21,747 23,275 25,093 25,722 26,106
Growth % -23% -4% 4% 1% 5% 7% 8% 3% 1
Automobile Industry 57,935 42,850 37,403 40,975 41,258 43,130 47,607 51,738 50,603 50,690
Growth % -26% -13% 10% 1% 5% 10% 9% -2% 0%
Auto Parts Industry 27,375 21,184 21,071 21,868 21,714 23,311 25,201 27,338 27,944 26,961
Growth % 0 -23% -1% 4% -1% 7% 8% 8% 2% -
/1 Source : INEGI (2002). Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de México: Cuentas de bienes y servicios 1995-2000. Vol. I. Aguascalientes: Author.
/2 Source : INEGI (2005). Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de México: Cuentas de bienes y servicios 1998-2003. Vol. I. Aguascalientes: Author.
/3 Based on Variation Percentage from: INEGI (2002). Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de México: Cuentas de bienes y servicios 1995-2000. Vol. I. Aguascalientes: Author.
Note: Constant Mexican pesos are Current Mexican pesos adjusted for inflation, to compare the true value from different time periods. The base was 1994 and the inflation was from 
December of one year to December (Detail on Appendix 17).
%
4%
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FDI in Mexican infrastructure has also made an impact in the export structure. Before the 
economic opening in the '80s, the top ten Mexican export products were primary goods 
(petroleum and natural gas, vegetables & fruit, coffee and others), while in the '90s only 
two of the top ten were in this category (Middlebrook and Zepeda, 2003, p. 17). 
 
Before NAFTA, there were environmental problems in Mexico and the regulations 
imposed less stringent limits than in U.S. and Canada. More recently however, there has 
been an improvement in regulations and economic incentives for new foreign companies 
to be environmentally responsible (United States-Mexico Chamber of Commerce, 1998). 
Some indigenous industries and MNEs have also improved environmental practices after 
NAFTA (Zarsky and Gallagher, 2004). In fact, in the auto industry, the car assemblers 
often require environmental certification, such as ISO 14000, from tier 1 suppliers. 
 
All of the economic and political structural changes in Mexico that boosted FDI in 
infrastructure and especially in the auto industry will be analyzed in section “Role of 
Government”  
 
Despite the importance of this industry, Mexico is still a technology follower in that it has 
not taken enough advantage of foreign technology (Valdes, 2002, p. 75). As the structure 
of ownership in the automobile industry is important in this regard, it will be discussed in 
following sections, in particular the majority presence of MNEs as a boost to automobile 
industry exports. 
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Another important factor condition for a superior export platform is transportation 
infrastructure: highways connecting the North and South American Markets and ports for 
the European and Asian markets. The highways in Mexico are well developed, but some 
of them carry the highest toll rates in the world. As argued by Prentice and Ojaj (2002 
p.339), access to public free highways represents a barrier to promote a competitive trade 
in North America. Another related issue is the Mexican-US border bottleneck that due to 
the corruption of customs officials, security concerns and drug traffic, had in the past lead 
to the necessity to sometimes fill out more than twelve documents and two revisions 
(Prentice and Ojaj, 2002, p. 345).  
 
Ports infrastructure has become more adequate and competitive, since NAFTA allowed 
their privatization and FDI has helped to modernize them, but there is still a need to 
improve land infrastructure and transportation (Prentice and Ojaj, 2002, p.337-338). 
 
Under factor conditions, Porter (1990) also suggests advanced factors, such as research 
institutes that collaborate with the industry to upgrade productivity and technology. In 
general, the relationship between universities and industry has not been well developed in 
Mexico. In Table 12, it can be seen that Mexico has increased its internal expenditures in 
research and development from 0.22% of GDP in 1993 to 0.40 % in 2002. This is 
substantially lower than other countries that invested in the auto industry in Mexico such 
as the U.S. (2.67%), Canada (1.82%), Germany (2.51%), and Japan (3.06%) in 2002. 
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Table 12: Internal Expenses in Research and Development of some Countries in the 
Auto Industry in Mexico (% GDP) 
1993 0.22 2.52 1.63 2.35 2.88
2002 0.40 2.67 1.82 2.51 3.06(1)
% funding from Industry
1993 14.3 58.3 43.3 61.9 68.2
2002 30.1 64.4 40.0 65.3 73(1)
(1) 2001.
México U.S. Canada Germany JapanYear
Source : Fox, V.(2004). Cuarto Informe de Gobierno [Fourth Government's 
Performance Report]. Presidencia de la República   
1
/
 
On the other hand, the participation of the industry in research and development (R&D) 
has shifted from 14.3% to 30.1% of the GDP, in 1993 and 2002 respectively indicating 
that Mexico is catching up with participation rates from more industrialized countries. 
Porter (1990) argues that in early stages of development, the government should be 
involved in R&D but the main actions that produce industry competitiveness are the 
industry’s R&D activities. As showed in Table 12, the other developed countries not only 
have more investment in R&D, as percentage of the GDP, but also the industry 
contribution to this investment ranges from 40% (Canada) to 73% (Japan). Still, progress 
is being made.  
 
Another element in Factor conditions is the availability of capital to invest and create new 
start-ups. At the end of the first year of NAFTA 1994, the Mexican peso was devalued 
against the U.S. dollar. This crisis produced an inter-bank annual interest rate of 90.5%. 
Over subsequent years the economy recovered slowly with interest rates: 34% (1999), 
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18.8% (2001), 8.75% (2003), and 6.2% (2004) (Banxico, 2005). Thus, comparing these 
rates with Canada and U.S., this was an unfavourable situation to promote capital 
ventures until recent years. Again, however, the view to the future is positive.  
 
In conclusion, there has been an evolution of factor conditions from an emphasis on basic 
factors to an early stage of advanced factors. There is a strong base of engineers and 
technicians as well as the high levels of productivity as noted above. As mentioned in an 
interview with a manager from Volkswagen Mexico: 
“Mexican engineers have been trained and they are responsible for the 
production of the New Beetle and Bora models. These models are produced only 
in Mexico, which means that we received the designs from VW AG in Germany, 
and then we manufactured them” 
Through the flows of FDI since the NAFTA, all of the manufacturing facilities of car 
assemblers have been modernized to transform Mexico into a successful export platform.  
And even though there was an industrial infrastructure before NAFTA, subsequent FDI 
has further promoted its modernization.  
 
6.3.2. Demand Conditions 
In order to analyze whether the indigenous Mexican market pressures car assemblers to 
innovate and anticipate foreign needs, or whether it is external forces such as foreign 
markets that pressure car assemblers in Mexico, it is necessary to examine the trends 
followed by the domestic and foreign market. (Figure 4) 
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Before NAFTA, the levels of car production were around 1,000,000 units (line 1) and 
more than 60% were oriented to the domestic market (line 3). After the NAFTA 
agreement and coincident with the economic crisis of 1994, the levels of production grew 
to more than 1,800,000 units. Apparently, these production levels were pulled by the 
foreign markets as domestic consumption was substantially reduced due to the crisis.  
 
In addition, the openness of the Mexican market started to attract imports of cars (line 4) 
up to 600,000 units per year. It is important to clarify that most of these imported cars 
were expensive ones, which means that during the economic recovery period only the 
upper income levels of the population could acquire them. What is really interesting is 
how the production levels increased for the export markets, specifically the U.S. and 
Canadian markets. 
Figure 4: Mexico's Vehicles Production, Domestic, Imports, & Exports 1990-2003 
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 Now, let’s take a look at the segment structure of the domestic market by analyzing the 
sales to distributors in Table 13.  The first thing that it is necessary to understand is that 
the total sales in 1992 were 445,303 units, while in 1995 sales dropped to 117,393. As 
mentioned before, Mexico lived through an important economic crisis due to the 
devaluation of the Mexican peso against the US dollar at the end of 1994. This event 
eroded the purchasing capability of the majority of the Mexicans, and caused the 
bankruptcy of many indigenous small and medium enterprises. Only somewhat later was 
a slow recovery possible and this is reflected in 1997 car sales. 
 
 
Table 13: Domestic Sales to Distributors in Mexico by Class (1992, 1995, 1997, 2002, 
2003) 
Class
Small 208,933 46.9% 47,786 40.7% 132,953 43.8% 426,847 59.1% 437,737 63.2%
Midsize 177,246 39.8% 52,785 45.0% 147,944 48.7% 239,271 33.1% 208,377 30.1%
Luxury 30,942 6.9% 10,437 8.9% 17,245 5.7% 46,999 6.5% 38,490 5.6%
Sport 28,182 6.3% 6,385 5.4% 5,416 1.8% 9,140 1.3% 7,962 1.1%
Total 445,303 100.0% 117,393 100.0% 303,558 100.0% 722,257 100.0% 692,566 100.0%
Note: Includes Imported cars
1992(1) 1997(1) 2003(2)
(1) Source:  (INEGI) Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía, e Informática 
(1998). La Industria Automotriz en México, p.91-92. Aguascalientes: Author
(2) Source : Based on INEGI (2005). Anuarios Estadísticos Por Entidad Federativa, 
2005 . Aguascalientes: Author.
1995(1) 2002(2)
 
 
As another view into this issue, we can take as a starting point the figures of 1995 to see 
the trend in the mix of four categories of cars: small, midsize, luxury, and sport that have 
been acquired by Mexican customers. In 1995, 40.7% of cars sold were small, while in 
2003 that segment had grown to 63.2% of total sales. At the same period, the midsize car 
segment lost 15% of total sales. Drawing on the researcher’s own experience of the 
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market, it is apparent that purchasers in the small size segment have been pressuring the 
automakers to produce not only cheaper cars but also those with better quality. For 
instance, Volkswagen de Mexico produced the Sedan VW, better known as “the people’s 
car” due to its accessible prices throughout the period 1965 to 2003. This model is not 
produced in Mexico anymore due to other automakers starting to produce cars in the 
same price segment, but better equipped. This has created a war to produce differentiated 
cars in this segment while maintaining low prices. 
 
Meanwhile, the opening of the economy under NAFTA also opened the possibility to 
import cars previously not accessible, especially in the luxury and sport car segments.  
Since 1994, several new car brands have become available in Mexico: Mercedes-Benz 
(1994), BMW and Honda (1995), Porsche (1996), Audi (1997), Jaguar (1998), Peugeot & 
Volvo (1999), Land Rover, Renault, and Seat (2000), and Toyota (2002) (IILSEN, 2003).  
 
The intensification of imported cars took place in 2000, due to the signature of other free 
trade agreements with Europe and Brazil (Rojas, 2004). With this free market, now there 
are 350 different models in the market (Luna, 2004). But even though 2002-2003 luxury 
car sales are almost 4 times greater than 1995 levels, the sports car category has been 
devastated and these two segments together have been hovering around 7% of the market. 
Still, in the US market, these two categories account for roughly 8.4%, so 7% may give 
good evidence of a sophisticated consumer base for Mexico given its lower per capita 
income levels.  
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Before NAFTA, the automakers established in Mexico produced old models different 
than the ones produced in more sophisticated markets. By 1998, the quality of the cars for 
export was the same as the cars for the domestic market (Ramirez De la O, 2002). Thus, 
it seems that the Mexican market has evolved in its level of sophistication. 
 
Comparing the maturity of U.S. market with the Mexican market, it seems that the 
Mexican market is growing after the period of economic correction and recovery. As 
indicated in Table 14, the number of vehicles registered has grown much faster than the 
Mexican population in the period 1990-2003. 
 
Table 14: Growth of Registered Vehicles and Population in Mexico    
Concept 1990 1995 2000 2003 Growth%
Population 81,249,645 97,483,412 20%
Cars 7,759,795 13,567,649 75%
(2) Source : Based on INEGI (2005). Anuarios Estadísticos Por Entidad 
Federativa, 2005 . Aguascalientes: Author.  
 
This growth was mainly due to an increase in the small and midsize car segments, as 
mentioned previously. In fact, in Mexico City, the capital and biggest city of Mexico, 
there is 1 car for every 2 people (Rojas, 2004).  Also as a consequence of such growth, 
Mexico has become the 9th market place in importance for VW Group (Volkswagen de 
México, S.A. de C.V. and Casa de Bolsa BBVA Bancomer, S.A. de C.V., June, 2003). 
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In conclusion, the 50 years of history of this industry has seen it evolve from non-
sophisticated consumers to more sophisticated ones, especially in the last ten years. 
However, the U.S. market has also put pressure on the quality of the Mexican production 
since NAFTA since the majority of production in Mexico is oriented to export markets, 
especially to the U.S.  Thus, it is the demand conditions of the U.S. market that have been 
a greater source of competitiveness than local demand conditions for this industry. Before 
NAFTA, production focused on old models with low levels of quality, while in the last 
several years, models have been updated and factories have been transformed with more 
sophisticated production processes in order to comply with the high quality requirements 
of the U.S. market.  
 
6.3.3. Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry  
As noted before, the automobile industry in Mexico has a history of at least 50 years 
starting from the first Volkswagen Sedan models imported from Germany 
(Comunicación Corporativa VW, 2004). By 1962, the first two assembly factories were 
built: Ford and later VW. In Table 15, the chronological establishment of foreign-owned 
automakers in Mexico is illustrated. 
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Table 15: Car Assemblers - Establishment and Facilities in Mexico 
No. Company Establishment Manufacturing Facilities Facilities Location
1 Ford 1962 Yes Cuautitlán, State of Mexico, Chihuahua, and Hermosillo, Sonora
2 VW 1962 Yes Puebla
3 GM 1963 Yes Toluca, State of Mexico;Ramos Arizpe, Coahuila; & Silao, Guanajuato.
4 Nissan 1966 Yes Aguascalientes, Ags.; Cuernavaca, Morelos
5 Daimler-Chrysler 1968 Yes Toluca, State of Mexico; Ramos Arizpe, Coahuila; Saltillo, Coahuila
6 Mercedez-Benz 1993 Temporarily Santiago Tianguistenco, State of Mexico (car operations 1993-1999, later only buses and Freighliner line)
7 Honda 1994 Yes Jalisco, Guadalajara
8 BMW/1 1994 Temporarily Toluca, State of Mexico (operations 1995-2003)
9 Porche/1 1996  -  -
10 Audi/1 1997  -  -
11 Jaguar/1 1998  -  -
12 Peugeot/1 1999  -  -
13 Volvo/1 1999  -  -
14 SEAT/1 2001  -  -
15 Renault 2001 Yes Aguascalientes, Ags.; Cuernavaca, Morelos
16 Land Rover/1 2001  -  -
17 Mini/1 2002  -  -
18 Toyota 2004 Yes Baja California
 /1 Some of the Imported Cars 
Source : Companie's Documents and Websites, and Mexican Automotive Manufacturers Association (AMIA): www.amia.com.mx 
 
 
 
These eighteen automakers are the most important in Mexico, but only eight of them 
have manufacturing facilities. It is important to say that, in the post-NAFTA period, these 
car assemblers have been continually investing in adding new manufacturing facilities. In 
1989 there were 13 automotive manufacturing plants in Mexico, while in 2001 there were 
30 (IILSEN, 2003).  
 
In Figure 5, the locations of the primary automobile clusters in Mexico are shown. There 
are 4 major clusters: North East and West, and Center East and West. The northern 
clusters were located with the purpose to export to the U.S. and Canada. Around these 4 
clusters there has been an attraction of suppliers and related industries that have 
complemented the development of this industry. 
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Figure 5: Car Assemblers Cluster Location in Mexico  
 
 
 
that required low and semi-skilled labour. However, in addition to the increase in 
manufacturing plants, car assemblers have been modernizing and increasing their 
automation which has required more skilled workers. First, the North American “Big 
Three” (Ford, GM, and Chrysler) changed their manufacturing strategies due to the 
increase of competitiveness of Japanese competitors. Then, their Mexican facilities 
shifted from producing for the local market to exporting, with high levels of technology 
(Brown, 2000). They have been investing on average US$1.3 billion per year from 1994 
to 2000 (Mattar, Moreno-Brid, and Peres; 2003; p.147). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first facilities, pre-NAFTA, were just assembly plants with low levels of automation 
Source: Author’s adaptation from the Mexican Automotive Manufacturers Association (AMIA): www.amia.com.mx
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The original VW facilities were traditional factories that produced old models for the 
efore NAFTA, the market was divided among the “Big Three”, plus VW and Nissan; 
y 
 
s mentioned above, European and Asian cars have been stealing market share from the 
of 
 
rom this we might reasonably conclude that, during the last ten years, there has been 
e 
he auto industry is an outstanding performance sector for Mexico in terms of export 
 not 
domestic market until the ‘80s, but in the ‘90’s, the factories were transformed into 
leading edge export-oriented facilities (Pries, 1999). 
 
B
but with the opening of free trade, the market share has had to be reassigned among man
more competitors (Table 16).  
 
 
A
Big Three. Figure 6 shows this trend in which it is apparent that by 2004 these two 
regions account for almost 50% of the market while the “Big Three” have lost 15% 
overall market share since their maximum peak during 1996 and 1997. 
 
F
intense competition and rivalry in this industry such that automakers have had to reduc
prices and offer better quality even in the small and midsize segments. 
 
T
growth and world market share. However, all of the automakers are foreign-owned 
enterprises. Before NAFTA, there was a restriction to FDI such that foreigners could
own more than 49% of a company. This initially created a mix in origin ownership but 
later the government allowed an increase in foreign ownership up to 100%.  
Table 16: Car Assemblers Market Share in Mexico (In units of cars) 
 54 
 
Figure 6: Cars Sales in Mexico - Market Share by Region Origin 
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Source : Author's calculations based on data from Mexican Automotive Manufacturers Association 
(AMIA): www.amia.com.mx (Data on Appnedix 12)  
 
Company 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
BMW 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.7% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5%
Mercedez- 
Benz 0.1% 0.5% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.6%
VW 
 27.3% 20.4% 15.8% 15.3% 17.0% 18.5% 19.8% 18.0% 16.3% 17.3% 15.6%
Audi 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3%
Seat 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.3% 2.6% 2.3% 2.1%
Honda 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 1.2% 1.9% 2.8% 2.9% 3.1% 3.1% 3.0% 2.7%
Toyota 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 2.2%
Nissan 21.9% 23.2% 18.3% 19.5% 21.7% 20.2% 20.3% 20.7% 21.7% 21.9% 21.4%
Renault 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 1.6% 1.9% 2.2%
Daimler- 
Chrysler 16.2% 16.1% 16.8% 14.0% 14.3% 13.6% 13.1% 14.2% 11.8% 10.2% 10.6%
Ford 
 15.2% 18.5% 20.3% 19.7% 17.2% 17.1% 16.8% 17.4% 16.4% 16.2% 16.2%
General 
Motors 19.3% 21.2% 27.4% 29.7% 27.2% 26.4% 25.4% 22.4% 23.6% 22.3% 22.2%
Sub-Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.7% 99.4% 98.9% 98.4% 97.2% 96.5%
Others /1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.6% 1.1% 1.6% 2.8% 3.5%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source : Based on sales from Mexican Automotive Manufacturers Association (AMIA): www.amia.com.mx (Data on Appendix 11) 
 /1 Others represent car companies without production of cars in Mexico (Acura, Jaguar, Land Rover, Mini, Mitsubishi, Peugeot, Porche, Smart, &
Volvo). Audi and Seat are imported cars, but they are not considered in this category due to VW is the distributor in Mexico. 
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According to Porter (1990), there are three kinds of FDI motivations to enter a host 
e 
aks 
 core 
ut these are not domestic operations by any means. The majority of the production goes 
day 
 de 
 
 
eration 
 the 
country: resource-based sourcing, market access, and shifting the core decisions to th
host country. In the case of the auto industry in Mexico, it was noted above that after 
NAFTA the original assembly plants shifted to manufacturing plants. This change spe
to dramatic increases in the level of technology employed, the sophistication of the 
processes involved, and the level of skills that workers should have. Even though the
decisions have largely remained in the home country headquarters of these automakers, 
some facilities have strategic operations for the MNE groups. 
 
B
to export markets, which means that the quality obtained in Mexico is according to 
international requirements. For instance, VW of Mexico produces 2,000 motors per 
with the greatest quality among the other facilities of the VW group in the world 
(Volkswagen de México, S.A. de C.V. and Casa de Bolsa BBVA Bancomer, S.A.
C.V., 2003). Similarly, the VW plant in Puebla, Mexico is the only facility of VW AG
Germany to produce the New Beetle that is exported to almost 80 countries 
(Comunicación Corporativa VW, 2004). Following this success, the German
headquarters decided to transform the VW Mexico facility into a high tech op
(Tovar, 2000). During the period 2003 to 2005, VW invested US$2 billion to produce
models “Bora” (only in Mexico), and Jetta G5 (Volkswagen de México, S.A. de C.V. and 
Casa de Bolsa BBVA Bancomer, S.A. de C.V., 2003). Today these models are being 
produced to the highest technical and quality standards for the Canadian and U.S. 
markets. VW in Puebla has a new area called Design Study, within the Technical 
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Development Department in 2000. The purposes of this area are to improve the cu
models' interior and exterior design and to generate new propositions to VW group 
(Volkswagen de México (2005). 
 
rrent 
 conclusion, the intense competition among the many car assemblers with 
, generates 
 
 for the 
6.3.4. Related and Supporting Industries  
The supply chain structure in Mexico follows the same structure of the auto industry 
 
of 
, 2003, 
In
manufacturing facilities in Mexico, and the increase of other imported brands
intense rivalry within the industry as competitors attempt gain or maintain a share of the 
local market. But it also competition for the U.S. market that pressures the car assemblers
in Mexico to produce with high levels of technology in order to upgrade the productivity 
standards that are necessary to satisfy the export market. This arms race to develop high 
levels of technology in manufacturing plants coupled with leading edge design 
capabilities shows that competitive rivalry is a strong source of competitiveness
automobile industry in Mexico. 
around the world. U.S. and European automakers have attempted to copy the Japanese
way of production, in which car assemblers outsource entire components to a hierarchy 
suppliers (ECLAC, 2004; Gereffi, 2003, p. 212). In this integrated system, Tier 1 
suppliers are the direct producers of integrated systems for car assemblers (Gereffi
p. 213). Similarly, Tier 2 suppliers produce components for Tier 1 suppliers. At the end 
of the supply chain there are Tier 3 firms, and in some cases Tier 4 that supply 
standardized products such as part metals and connectors (ECLAC, 2004). 
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According to Bancomext (2004), in 1994 there were 600 auto suppliers in Mexico, by 
2001, there were 875 registered auto parts suppliers, 60 of them tier 1 (Bancomext, 2002) 
(cited in ECLAC, 2004). By 2003 the number had grown to 1350 registered Auto 
suppliers, 281 of them being Tier 1 suppliers (Bancomext, 2004). The Industria Nacional 
de Autopartes (INA) (2005) reported 341 Tier 1 suppliers in 2005 (see appendices 13, 14, 
15, and 16 Main Tier Suppliers by Region). Even though, there is no one source that 
provides the longitudinal comparison, the number of auto parts suppliers have grown in 
the period 1993-2003. INA (2005) also notes that the ownership structure of the auto 
parts industry in Mexico comprises 70% foreign-owned firms and 30% indigenous firms. 
 
These foreign-owned auto suppliers have established themselves in Mexico as a direct 
result of local content conditions arising from NAFTA. The agreement sets the rules of 
origin, demanding that 62.5% of engines and transmissions and 50% of other parts used 
in automobile manufacturing in Mexico must themselves be produced in Mexico 
(Chambers and Smith, 2002, p.4). All the rules, government decrees, and laws will be 
discussed in the later section on “Role of Government”. All companies, including both 
American and non-American automobile companies such as VW, Mercedes-Benz, 
BMW, and Honda, are forced to adhere to these local content rules if they establish 
assembly factories in Mexico (Vega and De la Mora, 2003, p.177).  
 
To conform to this regulation regarding local content in the Puebla cluster, the German 
corporate headquarters of VW promoted the establishment of German suppliers in two 
periods: 1970 and 1990, (Carrillo and Gonzalez Lopez, 1999). Similarly, Gonzalez Lopez 
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(2000), when he studied the Toluca cluster in the center of the country, also found that 
the supply chain is based on corporate level agreements between global vehicle 
assemblers and global parts suppliers. The headquarters of North American, European, 
and some Asian car assemblers have negotiated with their global suppliers to locate parts 
manufacturing facilities around their manufacturing facilities wherever they assemble 
vehicles, including Mexico. Figure 7 illustrates the supply chain of the auto industry in 
Mexico. 
Figure 7: Supply Chain in the Automobile Industry in Mexico 
            
            
            
            
             
 
First, around the four automotive clusters mentioned in the previous section, these Tier 1 
auto parts suppliers have established their manufacturing facilities. They produce for the 
Mexican market and for the export market. These Tier 1 suppliers can be categorized as 
one of four types: a) Foreign-owned firms, b) Subsidiaries, c) Indigenous conglomerates, 
and d) Imported parts.  
 
Tier 1 Suppliers 
Foreign-owned firms are the majority category and they supply to more than one of the 
car assemblers. The top 10 Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) suppliers for 
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North America are: Delphi, Visteon, Lear Corp., Magna International, Johnson Controls, 
Dana Corp., Bosch, TRW, Denso Int'l America, ThyssenKrupp, among others (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 2004). All of them have a presence in Mexico.  
 
Carrillo and Lara’s work (2003) found that the “Maquiladoras”, foreign-owned assembly 
factories for exportation, established from 1970 to 1980, looked only for cheap labour 
and resources. However, since 1990 there is a new generation of facilities that have not 
only assembly and manufacturing functions, but also specialize in design, research, and 
supply chain management. For instance, Delphi Corporation has its largest Technical 
Center around the world in Mexico and has produced nearly 100 new inventions and 
patents from 1995 to 2002 (Carrillo and Lara, 2003). By 2005, the Technical Center had 
achieved 144 inventions including patents and U.S. defence publications (Tecnología, 
2005). 
 
Subsidiaries are wholly owned operations of the car assemblers and generally have little 
margin to create designs because usually the headquarters are responsible for those 
activities. Some of them have evolved to be independent suppliers such as Delphi Corp. 
from GM and Visteon from Ford. These two suppliers have increased their customer base 
outside their original parent.  
 
 Indigenous conglomerates constitute the smallest category. They are diversified 
companies with a long tradition in Mexico. In Table 17, the main Mexican conglomerates 
that supply the auto industry are illustrated. It is important to clarify that they are Tier 1 
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suppliers to some assemblers and in other cases Tier 2. In the latter case, they supply 
parts to other Tier 1s. All of them, with the exception of Grupo Qimmco, have at least 30 
years of experience. These companies have created strategic alliances or joint-ventures 
with foreign-owned companies, the majority of them in the auto parts industry, in order to 
acquire technology, know-how, expertise, or to work in collaborative projects with the 
automakers and auto-parts makers. These firms have high levels of technology, 
productivity, and quality. All of them have acquired international quality and reliability 
certifications such as QS-9000, ISO, VDA 6.1, among others, in order to be able to work 
for the automakers. 
 
As illustrated in Table 17, all Mexican Tier 1 suppliers have some level of research & 
development activities. They design components in close relationships with automakers 
and other auto parts manufacturers. Some of these companies are in the aluminium and 
steel industries. They have worked closely with the automobile industry which has 
allowed them to achieve higher levels of modernization (CECIC, 2002). 
 
Imported parts from foreign firms, in other countries, are the final category. These 
imports have a presence in the entire supply chain. As discussed above, Mexico has a 
negative trade balance in this sub industry. Local auto parts firms satisfy just 23% of the 
local market, while the rest is covered by imports (IILSEN, 2003).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 61 
 
Table 17: Indigenous Tier 1 Suppliers in Mexico 
VITRO 1909 Flat glass (cars), glass containers, and glassware Flat glass designs for auto makers
Pilkington(UK), Visteon(U.S.), Quimica 
M(U.S.)
Grupo Industrial Saltillo 1928
Autoparts (steel motor 
parts), Construccion, 
Household
Industrial Designs. Agreement of 
Technology Tranfers
Hydro Aluminium Holding Deutschland 
(Germany). VAW Yorkshire Foundries 
Limited 
SANLUIS Rassini 1929
Suspension component 
systems, leaf springs, brake 
and system components
SANLUIS Rassini Technical Center 
in Plymouth , Michigan (2000)
Brembo S.p.A. (Italy), NHK 
Spring(Japan), Fabrini and Cimebra 
(Brazil)
Industrias de Hule Galgo, S. 
A. de C.V 1952
Rubber for retread tires, 
butyl radial inner tubes, and 
boots and automotive parts
Technical Training Center. Prduct 
design. N/A
Grupo Carso (Condumex) 1954
Automotive Parts and 
Electronics, Automotive 
Cable, Cables, Energy, 
Installations
CONDUMEX Research and 
Development Center (CIDEC) 
Leading global autoparts companies (i.e. 
Delphi)
Grupo Proeza(Metalsa) 1956
Automotive (chasis, 
suspensions), Juices & 
fruits, Business 
Development
All stages in platforms development
Ogihara Corporation (Japan), Miyasu 
Seisakusho(Japan), Sumitomo 
Corp(Japan)
Grupo DESC Automotriz 1973 Autoparts, Chemicals, Food, Real State
Six Engineering and Development 
Centers
Dana Corporation(U.S.), Delphi(U.S.), 
GKN, Hayes Lemmerz International y 
TRW
Grupo ALFA 1974
Auto parts, Steel, 
Petrochemicals, Food, & 
Telecommunications
Technological developments are the 
patented by the subsidiary Nemak. 
Strategic alliances to acquire 
technology
Ford(U.S.), Worthington(U.S.), AK 
Steel (U.S.), among others.
Grupo QUIMMCO 1994
Automotive components, 
chemicals, and construction 
industries
Quimmco Centro Tecnológico. 
Design and manufacturing of molds, 
ArvinMeritor, Inc. and New Holland 
N.V (CNH Global, N.V.) 
Source : Company's reports and websites, and interviews.
R&D, Design. Strategic Alliances/ JIV ProductsCompany Establishment
 
 
Tier 2 and 3 Suppliers 
The second level of suppliers, Tier 2, is based largely on indigenous conglomerates and 
small and medium indigenous suppliers. However, there is a lack of integration between 
the Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers. As a result, many foreign owned Tier 1 firms import a 
substantial part of the raw materials they need so as to maintain their own international 
levels of competitiveness (CECIC, 2002). For instance, Delphi-Mexico sourced 90% of 
its direct materials purchasing from the U.S., even though 100% of its indirect purchasing 
comes from Mexico (Carrillo and Lara, 2003).  
 
As mentioned by a manager from an important indigenous Tier 1 supplier: 
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“When our company negotiates a contract with an automaker, the negotiation 
takes place in Detroit, not in Mexico. If we gain the contract, Detroit will 
establish the quantity and all the places in Mexico where they want us to deliver 
the components.”  
 
This is one of the obstacles for an indigenous supplier struggling to become Tier 1. On 
the other hand, a Tier 2 indigenous supplier also has problems to supply a Tier 1 firm. 
One Mexican purchasing manager, who works in a foreign-owned Tier 1 supplier, said: 
“We negotiate a 5 year contract with a car assembler, in which we need to 
provide evidence that our suppliers have quality practices such as Statistical 
Control Process, QS certifications, and sometimes just-in-time practices. This 
situation is a serious obstacle for local suppliers.” 
 
The Tier 3 suppliers segment is composed mainly of indigenous small and medium size 
suppliers of standard raw materials and imports from foreign firms located in other 
countries.  The Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers usually also compete in the auto parts 
aftermarket in Mexico. They offer less quality but better prices than the Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) (IILSEN, 2003).  
 
In conclusion, after analyzing the supply chain in the auto industry in Mexico, it seems 
that there is a strong structure of Tier 1 suppliers of which the majority are global 
suppliers. There is also evidence of a few indigenous Tier 1 suppliers that have a long 
history in Mexico, and after ten years of NAFTA, they have arranged collaborative 
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agreements with global companies. In doing so, they have acquired high-tech capital 
equipment and expertise. The next levels of suppliers, Tier 2 and Tier 3, seem to be not 
well integrated into the supply chain, but there is evidence of the creation of new small 
and medium size enterprises (SMEs) that produce related products for the export markets 
(Secretaria de Negociaciones Comerciales Internacionales (SNCI), 2004). 
 
6.3.5. The Role of Government 
As we have examined the automobile parts and assembly industries, in the above 
discussion, it has been clear that government rules, policies, and free trade agreements 
have contributed in large part to the current situation. Law changes in FDI, property 
rights, and privatization have all increased foreign investment in Mexico (Valdes, 2002, 
p.69). There have been four distinct regulatory periods for the automotive industry in 
Mexico that have been characterized as: Vehicle imports, Model of Import Substitution, 
Development of national auto parts firms, and Free Trade (CECIC, 2002). 
 
In the first stage, Mexico satisfied its domestic needs through very simple vehicle 
assembly facilities and importing cars from U.S. Car prices were controlled by the 
government and the local content of the auto industry was less than 20%. But the 
government wanted to develop indigenous industries, so Mexico then started adopting an 
Import Substitution Model. This model was applied to the auto industry by government 
decrees in 1962, 1972, and 1977 with the intent to develop an auto parts industry (Brown, 
2000). At that time, FDI in a particular project was limited to 49%. Limited also was the 
number of car assemblers and brands offered. Before 1994, only Ford, VW, Nissan, and 
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Chrysler had operations in Mexico. This limitation should have allowed indigenous 
suppliers to grow and feed the industry. Local content was required to be 60% for cars. 
 
By the late 70’s, Mexico had a trade deficit and problems acquiring capital goods. The 
cars produced in Mexico were old models with poor quality. Then, further government 
decrees were released in 1977 and 1987, in order to promote export activity (Brown, 
2000). At this stage the hope was to maintain the growth of local suppliers, but local 
content was reduced to 36% for those companies to focus on developing their export 
markets. Foreign ownership was allowed in auto parts firms, but only if they exported.  
 
Finally, the fourth stage started with the incorporation of Mexico into the GATT (now the 
WTO), and later saw the NAFTA agreement in which the auto industry was oriented to 
the free market. In this period, the percentages of local content were reviewed, imports of 
brand new cars were permitted and the market was opened to new car assemblers 
(Brown, 2000). Under NAFTA, all cars produced in North America were to have a 
specific regional content. The percentages were fixed according to different periods of 
time: 50% (1995-1997), 56% (1998-2000), and 62.5% (since 2001) (Bancomext, 2004). 
This local content had to be maintained if car assemblers wanted to receive 0% on tariffs 
when exporting to the other regions of NAFTA after the 10 years phase out period. This 
period of ten years started in 1994 with the purpose being to reduce duty tax when 
exporting within the NAFTA region. This means that Mexicans can now import brand 
new cars from the U.S. and Canada without duty tariffs. This is a challenge for the auto 
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industry in Mexico because car assemblers should have high standards of productivity 
and at the same time high levels of technology. 
 
Mexico has signed several free trade agreements as noted in Table 18. All of them require 
a percentage of local content in the segment of cars assembled within the region in 
question. The intent is to continue promoting the auto parts industry in Mexico. 
Unfortunately for the development of indigenous firms, a 100% foreign-owned Tier 1 
supplier (or maquiladora) established in Mexico is considered by NAFTA as “local”. 
Thus by doing little more than employing local labour, the auto supply chain can satisfy 
the rule of origin (local content).   
 
In addition to the phase out reduction on tariffs on auto parts imports to almost 0%, the 
Tier 1 suppliers import nearly all their raw materials, leaving only space for the very best 
Tier 2 Mexican companies such as the indigenous conglomerates discussed above. 
 
Table 18: Mexican's Free Trade Agreements with other Nations 
 
Free Trade Agreement Countries Started
NAFTA U.S. and Canada Jan. 1, 1994
G3 Colombia and Venezuela Jan. 1, 1995
México - Costa Rica Costa Rica Jan. 1, 1995
México - Bolivia Bolivia Jan. 1, 1995
México - Nicaragua Nicaragua July 1, 1998
México - Chile Chile Aug. 1, 1999
EU European Union July 1, 2000
México - Israel Israel July 1, 2000
México - TN (Triáangulo del Norte 
[North Triangle])
The Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras March 15, 2001
México - EFTA (European Free 
Trade Association)
The Republic of Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein, 
the Kingdom of Norway and the Swiss Confederation 
July 1, 2001
México - Uruguay Uruguay July 15, 2004
México - Japón Japan Apr. 1, 2005
Source : The Ministry of the Economy Mexico: http://www.economia.gob.mx/  
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One of the managers interviewed from VW explained what it means to be a local 
supplier: 
“A local supplier is someone that has met the requirements of the group and 
preferably is installed near our facilities to deliver just-in-time. It doesn’t matter 
if its original capital is Mexican, North American, European, or Asian. For us it 
is a Mexican supplier.” 
 
Finally, despite the fact that NAFTA has continued the trend in Mexico to an openness of 
trade since its entry into GATT in 1986, there is still a need to improve the internal 
regulatory framework for businesses (Valdes, 2002, p.79). The influence of government 
is important not only to continue to increase the auto industry’s productivity, but also to 
change some business taxes, customs, and labour regulations to remain competitive 
(Ramirez De la O, 2002). 
 
6.4. Assessment of the Diamond Model Framework 
A summary table containing the assessment of each of the determinants of the Diamond 
Model Framework is shown in Table 19. This table makes reference both to the Mexican 
diamond itself and to support from the U.S. diamond to the Mexican diamond. Each of 
the sources of competitive advantage is rated at three possible levels: High (H), Medium 
(M), and Low (L) or, in some cases, at a transition stage (i.e. L-M from Low to Medium). 
These assessments are according to the author’s judgement based on the analysis in the 
previous sections. 
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In conclusion, the Mexican diamond for the auto industry could be characterized as 
moderately competitive across most of the Diamond’s determinants with its relative 
success on the global stage attributable to substantial support from the U.S. diamond 
(particularly with respect to Demand) and the diamonds of other countries with global 
competitors in this industry. In other words, despite that Mexico has won share of total 
world exports in small and midsize cars, light trucks, and auto parts, there is evidence that 
the determinants of the national Diamond are not the main source of these 
competitiveness. 
 
However, as in other small nations with open economies, the double diamond framework 
is a useful extension of the original model to understand alternative sources.  
 
 
The Diamond Model has been a useful tool to understand to some extent the areas that 
provide support to this industry and the weak points that should be reinforced in the 
automobile industry in Mexico, but the analysis also showed that there are additional 
sources of competitiveness that came from the U.S. Diamond especially. 
 
 
The Mexican Automobile Diamond has been supported for FDI in three of the 
determinants: factor conditions, firm strategy, and related industries. As Dunning (1993) 
stated, MNEs are the protagonist actors of the regionalization process. In a U.S. 
Automotive report (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2004) it was argued that even 
without NAFTA, this industry would be regionalized among the three countries. 
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Table 19: Assessment of the Mexican Diamond and Doubled Diamond (U.S.) 
Country 
Diamond 
Concept Factor 
Conditions 
Demand 
Conditions 
Firm 
Strategy, 
Structure, 
and 
Rivalry 
Related and 
Supporting 
Industries 
The Role of 
Government 
Assessment M M H L-M M 
Mexico Sources of 
Competitiveness 
Basic industrial 
infrastructure. 
Skilled 
workers. 
Productivity. 
Low cost raw 
materials and 
labour. 
Market access. 
Evolution from 
low to medium 
– high 
sophistication. 
Growth of 
vehicle park.  
Strong 
competition 
among many 
global firms 
since 1994. 
 
Small base of 
indigenous Tier 
1 suppliers. 
Aluminium and 
Steel Industry. 
JVs between 
indigenous 
firms and 
foreign-owned 
suppliers. 
NAFTA and 
other free trade 
agreements. 
FDI law. 
Local content 
favours 
employment over 
technology 
transfer 
Assessment H H H H M 
U.S. 
support 
Sources of 
Competitiveness 
U.S. MNEs 
automakers 
FDI in Mexico. 
Car assemblers 
Technology 
High 
sophistication 
of foreign 
buyers 
Externalized 
by U.S. 
demand 
conditions and 
FDI in Mexico 
U.S. MNEs 
global suppliers 
FDI in Mexico 
The signature of 
NAFTA 
 
 
In the case of the automobile industry in Mexico, the regionalization of the North 
American economic bloc (Canada, U.S., and Mexico) allocates different sources of 
competitiveness in each of these countries.  
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6.5. The Role of the MNE: the VW Cluster in Puebla 
Carrillo and Lara (2003) argue that the presence of MNE auto manufacturers in Mexico 
such as VW, Ford, Nissan, and GM has produced significant regional developments in 
terms of workers’ learning and new start-ups, both local and foreign owned. However it 
appears to be a fact that most car automakers were originally established in Mexico for 
other reasons, usually to have access to the Mexican market before the NAFTA, and later 
to have access to the U.S. market, while simultaneously gaining access to basic factors 
such as resources and cheap labour. As discussed earlier, Porter’s position on the 
contribution of MNEs to national competitiveness emphasizes the latter while treating the 
former as a relatively insignificant spill-over effect. The object of the second research 
question in this study is to determine the extent to which Carrillo and Lara’s argument is 
sound.  
 
We undertake this task by focussing on the Volkswagen cluster in the state of Puebla that 
has been established since 1962. First, some descriptive facts: This cluster agglomerates 
an important grouping of suppliers and related industries; however, it is itself part of one 
of the four larger clusters, Center East, mentioned earlier. Within the Central East area of 
Mexico are the states of Hidalgo, Mexico City, Morelos, Puebla, and Tlaxcala, the total 
area from which VW sources auto parts from nearly 300 suppliers. 
 
As discussed above, VW Puebla has historically had the greatest levels of local 
(indigenous and foreign-owned firms) purchasing, for example, 41.5% in 1999 compared 
with Ford and GM at 27% and 29.6% respectively (Juárez, 2001). Thus, if MNEs play a 
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significant role in sustainable national competitiveness, we expect to find it here where 
there are more indigenous suppliers than in other clusters. We also hope to reach some 
conclusions about why VW has reached this level of indigenous supply chain 
contribution given the clear policy implications. 
 
By 2000, VW had benefited its 285 local suppliers by acquiring 60% of its inputs from 
them and had helped 200 of them to get certified (ISO 9000 and VDA 6.1) through its 
Institute of Training and Development (Comunicación Corporativa VW, 2001). Sixty 
suppliers out of 285 are located within Puebla Cluster with 27 immediately beside the 
VW facilities to support just-in-time delivery (Comunicación Corporativa VW, 2004).  
 
However, while its use of indigenous suppliers is better than most, the fuzziness of the 
local vs. indigenous distinction discussed above remains evident when VW’s major 
suppliers are examined. In Table 20, some of the most important Tier 1 suppliers of VW 
in Puebla are shown. The majority of them have German origin. This is not surprising, 
since in the '90's The German Big Three (VW, BMW, Mercedes-Benz) started a process 
of globalization in which it was deemed critical that Tier 1 suppliers should have 
production factories close to the car assembler's plant (Pries, 1999).   
 
Since these suppliers at the time were German firms and local content rules did not 
recognize country of ownership, it was natural that the existing suppliers would simply 
relocate their manufacturing facilities to Puebla. 
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Table 20: Tier 1 Auto parts Suppliers in Puebla, Mexico 
Company Origin
AUTOTEK/MAGNA INTERNATIONAL Canada
PLASTIC OMNIUM France
FAURECIA DUROPLAST France
BENTELER de MEXICO S.A. de C.V. Germany
BROSE Inc. Germany
FTE MEXICANA Germany
HP PELZER AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS Germany
TEXTRON Germany
KIEKERT DE MEXICO Germany
LAGERMEX Germany
LUK Germany
PARKER HANNIFIN Germany
SIEMENS Germany
ThyssenKrupp Metalúrgica de Mexico S.A. de C.V. Germany
THYSSENKRUPP PRESTA Germany
VITRO: AUTOCRISTALES DE ORIENTE Mexico
SANLUIS  Rassini Mexico
SKF Swiss
FEDERAL MOGUL U.S.
TENNECO U.S.
TRW Sistemas de Direcciones, SA de CV U.S.
JOHNSON CONTROLS U.S.
Source : Based on interviews in the Volskwagen cluster, in Puebla  
 
It is possible, however, to see the wholesale relocation of German suppliers as a 
necessary bridge toward a larger role for indigenous firms since local firms were not in a 
position at that time to take up this work. These German suppliers need to source other 
raw materials from tier 2 suppliers that presumably can be indigenous firms leading to a 
gradual upgrading of local competencies. For example, the industrial park, Finsa, that 
contains the VW cluster, is composed mainly of auto part firms wherein there are two 
meetings a year in which every firm discusses common interest issues. In addition, the 
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cluster promotes the development of human capital resources (Pries, 2000) which has led 
to an abundant source of Mexican engineers and technicians available within the cluster. 
 
According to an executive of VW, the manufacturing facilities to produce the New Beetle 
and Bora models have high standards of productivity and technology. As mentioned 
before, these models are only produced in Mexico, and with the Jetta G5 model are 
exported to foreign markets, especially to U.S. and Canada. The designs of the first two 
models were made in Germany, but all the manufacturing plants of the group have to 
compete for the exclusivity of production. The decision to produce the New Beetle only 
in Puebla was made based on: geographic position, the industrial park in the region, and 
the established global suppliers there (Tovar, 2000).  
 
As a further trickle-down benefit, the fact that VW’s presence in Mexico has allowed the 
development of a cluster of world class suppliers was also a major factor in Puebla’s 
ability to attract BMW and Mercedes-Benz Mexico, because neither assembler has 
enough volume to attract global suppliers on their own (Carrillo and Gonzalez Lopez, 
1999).  
 
VW of Mexico also has a training institute to provide several kinds of managerial, 
technical, and quality expertise for the organization itself and to current or potential 
suppliers. VW, joint with some government programs, is helping to upgrade the 
knowledge and skills of 200 small and medium size indigenous companies that provide 
services and complemented materials. Some of these programs are: COMPITE, CRECE, 
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and NAFIN (Comunicación Corporativa VW, 2001), however, as expressed by an 
executive of VW: 
“The main problem for these small and medium size companies is to receive the 
appropriate funding from banking institutions. Sometimes the sourcing is not 
enough, and the period is too short” 
 
This cluster also faces the problems of the lack of integration between Tier 1 and Tier 2 
suppliers described above. Only Tier 1 firms are integrated to VW, working in close 
collaboration. Despite the efforts of VW to integrate Tier 2 and 3 suppliers, there is not a 
strong base of certified suppliers in QS-9000, ISO 9000, and VDA 6.1. For VW Mexico, 
the work that has been done to help these 200 suppliers to be certified in quality standards 
has been successful. However, the majority of them are MNEs or joint ventures with 
Mexican firms. 
 
But success stories do exist. A manager from a supply company of VW mentioned two 
successful cases of indigenous Tier 2 suppliers that replaced imports from U.S. 
companies of steel and sand. Both were certified and have been continuing to supply the 
quantities specified.   
 
In conclusion, the presence of VW in Mexico as a MNE has contributed to continually 
upgrading investment in knowledge and skills in the region. It has a successful 
integration with Tier 1 suppliers and has helped to attract other primary car assemblers to 
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Mexico. However, there is not enough evidence that Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers have 
become part of the supply chain.  
 
These results are similar to other clusters in the country, for instance the cluster around 
Nissan manufacturing facilities is based on fully integrated Tier 1 Japanese companies 
with indigenous suppliers provide only indirect materials and services such as 
transportation of personnel, security, and offices supplies (according to the government 
representative of the cluster in Aguascalientes, Mexico). In the case of the northern 
clusters, there is evidence of some producers of steel mechanical pieces that have evolved 
and now are suppliers of Tier 1 firms. But again these are isolated cases. 
 
In general, Foreign Direct Investment in the automobile industry in Mexico has evolved 
in terms of MNEs motivations and corporate strategies, which is an evidence of a broader 
role of MNEs when investing in a host country (table 21). 
 
Before the NAFTA, the main motivation was to have access to the protected Mexican 
market (strategy #1). Later in the early days of the NAFTA, the agreement provided an 
opportunity to take advantage of basic factors such as low cost raw material and semi-
skilled workers (strategy #2) while also gaining duty free access to broader NAFTA 
markets. After ten years of NAFTA, the MNEs have continually investing in the industry 
with the purpose to transform the original infrastructure, into an export platform. This 
strategy has created a more advanced infrastructure that requires more technical skills 
from Mexican engineers and technicians (strategy #3a) ECLAC (2004). In parallel to this 
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strategy, the U.S. automobile industry has taken advantage of NAFTA’s regionalization 
impact, in which both Canada and Mexico play important roles as car producers and auto 
parts producers (strategy #3b). In this way, the Mexican diamond has been complemented 
by the U.S. diamond due to regionalization as explained by Dunning (1993).  
 
In 2002, U.S. imports of automotive parts from Canada and Mexico accounted for 53% 
of the total (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2004) providing some evidence of the 
regionalization of the auto industry. As Rugman and Verbeke (2004) have argued, the 
majority of MNEs follow regional strategies, rather than global strategies, citing the fact 
that 80.3% of the total sales of 320 firms they studied were done in the home region of 
their triad (NAFTA, EU, or Asia).  
 
Table 21: MNEs Foreign Direct Investment Strategies: the Auto industry in Mexico 
 
MNEs FDI 
strategy 
Explained the case of 
the Auto industry in 
Mexico 
Main points 
1) Market access 
(market-seeking) 
Partially Mexican market is 
growing 
2) Factor sourcing 
(resource-seeking) 
Partially There is a basic 
infrastructure, cheap 
labour, skilled workers 
3a) Efficiency-seeking Definitively Export platform, 
medium infrastructure, 
base of engineers & 
technicians 
3b) Bloc/ regional 
integration 
Definitively U.S., Canada, & Mexico 
are integrated in this 
industry 
3c) Globally 
rationalized operations 
Partially – Auto parts Some auto-parts 
components are 
produced in Mexico for 
the Global supply chain 
4) Shifted to a host 
country(Technological-
asset-seeking) 
Not yet Isolated R&D steps 
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Despite the fact that Mexico has a deficit trade balance in auto parts, some global 
suppliers and indigenous suppliers have produced auto parts for the whole supply chain 
within the NAFTA region (strategy 3b and 3c). That is the case for Delphi Corporation 
where fully 20% of its manufacturing facilities are located in Mexico allowing them to 
export some components to GM’s and other North American car assembler’s operations 
in the U.S. and Canada. 
 
Finally, there is isolated evidence that some MNEs have started to do early stage R&D in 
Mexico, even though the majority of the core decisions are still made in headquarters. 
Thus, although the beginnings are in place, it would be premature to say that MNEs, both 
automakers and auto parts suppliers, are in Mexico due to the presence of state of the art 
knowledge and practices in automobile technology. On the other hand, this presence of 
MNEs has not fostered a massive development of indigenous suppliers. As noted by a 
manager of a foreign-owned firm: 
“Mexico has an enormous opportunity to develop tier 2 and 3 suppliers, because 
tier 1 suppliers would prefer to have a local sourcing rather than importing from 
other countries. However, the challenges are to guarantee the quantity, quality, 
and prices required by the supply chain”. 
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7. Conclusion and Discussion 
 After analyzing the auto industry in Mexico and the Volkswagen cluster in Puebla, we 
can establish some important conclusions about the industry and about the theory of 
international competitiveness presented by Porter and other scholars. 
 
It is important to make an initial comment about some inconsistencies that were found 
when analyzing the documents for this study. Not surprisingly, the Mexican Government 
reports were more optimistic about the competitiveness of the industry than the work 
conducted by researchers, company interviews and reports, and third party institutions 
such as NGOs. 
 
The main differences appeared when analyzing the possible development of indigenous 
suppliers as a result of the presence of MNEs during the ten years covered by the study. 
A general agreement was that there is some development of local suppliers, but the 
majority of them are foreign-owned companies. Even the small numbers of indigenous 
conglomerates that are successful have strategic alliances with these other MNEs. There 
are only a few cases of small and medium size businesses that have been developed.  
 
The main findings of this study have several implications for scholars. As applied above, 
Porter’s Diamond Model is a powerful tool to identify the sources of international 
competitiveness for an industry. However, for developing countries that have recently 
entered the free market, the model needs some adjustments. In the case of Mexico, and 
especially for its automobile industry, the extension called the “Doubled Diamond” 
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(Rugman and D’Cruz, 1993) and the idea of regionalization by Dunning (1993) helps in 
explaining alternative sources of competitiveness. In this respect, the study supports other 
empirical studies finding similar conclusions in other jurisdictions (Cartwright, 1993; Oz, 
2000; Clancy et al., 2001).  
 
While there is no doubt that it is preferable for a country to either develop its indigenous 
industries or attract MNEs that are willing to shift their home base due to the advance 
sources developed in the host country, in the case of recent industrialized countries, such 
as Mexico, MNEs can be proactive in creating a more advanced infrastructure in the host 
country. The automobile industry in Mexico provides evidence that there are intermediate 
steps to the final point proposed by Porter, in which MNEs looks for export platforms 
with a medium advanced infrastructure. This intermediate point is preferable to only 
providing market access or sourcing factors to MNEs of foreign countries. 
 
Porter (1990) also specified that these MNEs can be the starting point to create a cluster 
where indigenous industries can grow and learn (p.679). Based on this study’s findings, 
the presence of the MNE VW has been the main protagonist for substantial growth and 
development within the Puebla industrial cluster. While information regarding other 
clusters is more anecdotal, it would appear that the main four automobile clusters in the 
country are also being positively impacted by the presence of MNEs in Mexico. Within 
these clusters Mexican conglomerates have increased their expertise, technology, and 
export value. However, there is only limited evidence of technology transfer from MNEs 
to indigenous small and medium size firms inside the VW and other clusters. 
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The implications for practitioners in the industry and government policymakers are 
several. There is no doubt that the automobile sector in Mexico is internationally 
competitive and even though the car assemblers are 100% foreign-owned, their 
motivations to establish in the country appear to be progressing beyond merely having 
access to the market and securing some basic factors to reduce costs. In this sense, the 
auto industry in Mexico is offering several sources of advantage to its host: a semi-
advanced industrial infrastructure, an abundant base of skilled workers, several free trade 
agreements that position the country as an export platform, and a balance of adequate 
technology and low costs. This stage of development is evidence of the significant level 
of international competitiveness that Mexico has achieved in this industry. Last year, 
Toyota established its first facility in Mexico and it promises to continue investing, as are 
the other car assemblers, in upgrading its technology and production capability. 
 
However, these sources of advantage can be emulated by other nations. For instance, 
China is moving from just assembling products with low labour costs to more 
sophisticated manufacturing while maintaining its low costs. Thus, Mexico must make 
progress in three main areas: First, the regulatory framework that is an obstacle for the 
development of a competitive industry needs work in order to attract and maintain FDI. 
Second, policymakers should work with industry to increase and improve programs of 
supplier development within the auto industry such as that described at VW above. There 
are enormous opportunities for Tier 2 and 3 suppliers to integrate within the supply chain. 
And third, it is important for the country to work on a long term plan to establish 
collaborative projects of research and development between universities and industries. 
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The government should also provide financial incentives to invest in R&D for firms and 
universities in order to transform the Mexican export platform into a more innovative 
industry. 
 
There are some limitations in this research that must be addressed. A single case study 
cannot be generalized to other industries or to other countries. But other case studies 
conducted to test the Diamond Model Theory have arrived at similar findings about the 
necessity of an extension model (doubled diamond / multiple diamonds) and the need to 
amplify the role of MNEs in host countries. These corroborations provide some comfort 
regarding the generalizability of this study’s findings. Also, in contrast to the broad 
survey of industries more characteristic of studies of national competitiveness, this study 
has provided deeper insight into the dynamics of competitiveness in a single industry. 
finally, this case was unique due to the high technology nature of its focal industry, an 
important issue in Porter’s work (1990). The study was also conducted longitudinally 
providing insights across a ten year period in contrast to usual cross-sectional analyses.  
 
Future research can be focused on determining if the efficiency-seeking stage will lead to 
what Porter called shifting home base to a host base or, in keeping with the truly nation-
less global corporation, multiple host bases. Also, it would be useful to develop more 
fully the next steps that policy makers should take to promote the development of Tier 2 
and 3 suppliers because it seems that after ten years of NAFTA, there are still only a few, 
isolated cases of success. Mexico needs more. 
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(ECLAC) (2000)
Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1999 ,  Santiago, Chile. United Nations 
publication
NGO Economic Commision for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) (2004)
Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2003 (LC/G.2226-P/I),  Santiago, Chile, May. 
United Nations publication
NGO Ramirez De la O, R. (2002) Mexico: NAFTA and the Prospects for North American Integration. C.D. Howe Institute Border Papers, 
173
R Carrillo, J. (1997) Maquiladoras automotrices en México: clusters y competencias de alto nivel. In M. Novick and M.A. 
Gallart.(Eds.), Competitividad, redes productivas y competencias laborales, pp.193-234. Mexico: 
Centro Interamericano de Investigación y Documentación Sobre Formación Profesional.
R Carrillo, J. (2000) The Integration of the Mexican Automobile Industry to the U.S.A.: Between Policies and Corporate 
Strategies. Actes du GERPISA No.28, February, p.55-77.
R Carrillo, J. (2004) Transnational Strategies and Regional Development: the Case of GM and Delphi in Mexico, Industry 
and Innovation , 11(1), 127.
R Carrillo, J. and Gonzalez Lopez, S. (1999) Relaciones Cliente-Proveedor de Empresas Automotrices Alemanas en México. [Relations Client-
Supplier of German Auto Firms in Mexico]. Actes du GERPISA  No. 25, 93.
R Carrillo, J. and Lara, A. (2003) Industrial Evolution of the Auto Part Sector in Mexico and Changes in the Division Labor, Eleventh 
GERPISA International Colloquium, June. 
R Chambers, E.J. and Smith, P.H. (2002) NAFTA in the New Millenium: Questions and Contexts. In E.J. Chambers and P.H. Smith (Eds), 
NAFTA in the New Milenium  (p.331-353). La Joya, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies; Edmonton: 
University of Alberta Press
R Gereffi, G. (2003) Mexico's Industrial Development: Climbing Ahead or Falling Behind in the World Economy?. In K.J. 
Middlebrook and E. Zepeda (Eds), Confronting Development: Assessing Mexico's Economic and Social 
Policy Challenges (p.195-240). Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
R Gonzalez Lopez, S. (2000) Estrategias Corporativas y Espacios Locales: Las Empresas Automotrices en la Zona de Toluca, Mexico 
[Corporate Strategies and Local Spaces: The Automotive enterprises in Toluca Zone, Mexico]. Actes du 
GERPISA , No.29, 69.
R Juárez, H. (2001) Nuevas Integraciones Industriales en la Industria del Automóvil en México: El Caso de la Fábrica 
Modular II [New Industrial Integration within the Automotive Industry in Mexico: The Case of the 
Modular Factory II]. Trabajadores en Linea , May-June, 24, 
R Mattar, J., Moreno-Brid, Juan C., and Peres, W.(2003) Foreign Investment in Mexico after Economic Reform. In K.J. Middlebrook and E. Zepeda (Eds), 
Confronting Development: Assessing Mexico's Economic and Social Policy Challenges  (p. 123-160). 
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
R Middlebrook, K.J. and Zepeda (2003) On the Political Economy of Mexican Development Policy. In K.J. Middlebrook and E. Zepeda (Eds), 
Confronting Development: Assessing Mexico's Economic and Social Policy Challenges  (p. 162-194). 
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
R Prentice, B.E. and Ojaj, M. (2002) Transportations: Bottlenecks and Possibilities. In E.J. Chambers and P.H. Smith (Eds), NAFTA in the 
New Milenium  (p.331-353). La Joya, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies; Edmonton: University of 
Alberta Press
R Pries, L. (1999) The Dialectics of Automobile Assemblers and Suppliers Restructuring and Globalization of the German 
"Big Three". Actes du GERPISA No. 25, 77.
R Pries, L. (2000) Reestructuración Productiva y Estrategias de Aprovisionamiento: el Caso de la Volkswagen de México en 
la Región de Puebla. [Productive reestructuring and sourcing stategies: the Case Volswagen in Puebla 
Region]. Region y Sociedad , 12(19), 161.
R Valdes, J.L. (2002) NAFTA and Mexico: A Sectoral Analysis. In E.J. Chambers and P.H. Smith (Eds), NAFTA in the New 
Milenium  (p.61-82). La Joya, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies; Edmonton: University of Alberta 
Press
R Vega, G. and De la Mora, L.M. (2003) Mexico's Trade Policy: Financial Crisis and Economic Recovery. In K.J. Middlebrook and E. Zepeda 
(Eds), Confronting Development: Assessing Mexico's Economic and Social Policy Challenges  (p. 162-
194). Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
C: Companies' reports, G: Government, IA: Industry Association, M: Magazines, NGO: Non-Government Organizations, and R: Researchers' works
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Appendix 2: Email Invitation to participate in the Telephone Interview 
 
 
To whom it may concern 
Company’s Name 
 
Hello, my name is Salvador Barragan. I am a Mexican citizen working toward my Master 
of Science in Management degree at the University of Lethbridge in Canada. I would like 
to invite you to participate in a Telephone Interview for my thesis research project about 
the competitiveness of the automobile and auto parts industries in Mexico after 10 
years of NAFTA.  
 
The purpose of this study is to understand the relations among the car assemblers and the 
auto parts supply companies, as well as the sources of competitiveness for the entire 
industry. In addition, I would like to better understand how the Automotive Cluster in the 
State of Puebla and surrounding areas has benefited local and indigenous industries in 
terms of competitiveness, technology transfer, management skills, cooperation and 
learning. 
 
I attach a “Formal Invitation Letter” from my Supervisor Dr. John Usher, in which he 
explains in more detail additional information about this study, the interview process, the 
confidentiality of the interview, and contact information. 
 
Please email me back if you consent to participate in a Telephone Interview. Your help 
will be greatly appreciated. 
 
Thanks in advance, 
 
Salvador Barragan 
MSc in management student 
University of Lethbridge, 
Lethbridge, AB, Canada. 
 
Email: salvador.barragan@uleth.ca
Phone: (403)-329-2162 
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Appendix 3: Formal Invitation Letter 
 
2005/July/9 
 
To Whom It May Concern:  
Company’s name 
 
Thank you for considering our invitation to participate in a Telephone Interview for our research project 
about the competitiveness of the automobile and auto parts industries in Mexico after 10 years of 
NAFTA underway at the University of Lethbridge in Alberta, Canada. This study is being conducted by 
Salvador Barragan, a Mexican student in our Master of Science in Management program. 
 
As noted by Salvador in his email, the purpose of this study is to understand the relations among the car 
assemblers and the auto parts companies, as well as the sources of competitiveness for the entire industry. 
In addition, we hope to better understand the extent to which the Automotive Cluster in the State of Puebla 
has benefited local and indigenous industries in terms of competitiveness, technology transfer, management 
skills, cooperation and learning. 
 
Please note the following points from our research protocol of: 
1) The Telephone Interview will take around 40 minutes. 
2) Salvador will ask you a list of prepared questions and he will take notes. 
3) The benefits of this project are primarily academic but may have both policy and practical implications. 
If you are interested, a summary of the findings will be available in about six months and you may contact 
either me or Salvador for a copy. 
4) We will protect the confidentiality of you and your company by only stating in the final report that 
“Interviews were conducted with managers from the auto parts industry within the automobile Cluster in 
Puebla, Mexico and surrounding areas.” 
5) If there is a need to quote part of your comments, we will ask you for further approval, while continuing 
to maintain your and your company’s anonymity. 
6) You have the right to not participate or withdraw at any time, even during the interview. 
7) The information that you provide will used in Salvador’s thesis and for subsequent publication in an 
academic journal. 
 
If you consent to participate, please email me or Salvador Barragan to set an appointment date and time for 
the telephone interview. 
 
If you have any questions about the study, please call me (phone: 403-329-2759; email: 
john.usher@uleth.ca) or Salvador Barragan (phone:403-329-2162; email: salvador.barragan@uleth.ca) at 
the University of Lethbridge. Questions of a more general  
Nature may be addressed to the Office of Research Services, University of Lethbridge (phone: 403-329-
2747). 
 
 
 
Thank you greatly for your cooperation, 
 
John M. Usher 
 
John M. Usher, PhD 
Professor of Strategy and Org Theory 
Faculty of Management 
University of Lethbridge 
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Appendix 4: Interview Guide 
 
Interview Guide for Managers or Representatives of the automobile industry and auto 
parts industry in the Cluster of Volkswagen de Mexico (VWM) in Puebla, Mexico. This 
guide will be altered (wording changed, applied questions dropped) for interviewees in 
government or industry associations. These will not be substantive changes.  
 
General Questions about the interviewee: 
 
1) What is your position in the company? 
 
2) How long have you been in the company? How long in the industry? 
 
General Questions about the automobile industry in Mexico: 
 
3) Describe the government’s role in promoting the development of this industry. 
a. NAFTA 
b. FDI law 
c. Other incentives 
d. Financial support  
e. Development of basic infrastructure  
f. Development of related infrastructure 
g. Research institutes or university-industry research 
 
4) Can you talk about the industry, before NAFTA was signed? 
 
5) Can you explain the differences in the hierarchy of suppliers in the automobile 
supply chain? (Tier 1, 2, 3) 
a. Characteristics 
b. Level of technology and capability 
c. Level of co-operation or integration among them 
 
Questions about the Cluster Volkswagen Mexico (VWM) 
 
6) Dou you know if indigenous industries within the Cluster VWM meet the 
characteristics to be Tier 1 or Tier 2? 
a. Capacity to supply long term contracts 
b. Quality certifications (QS, ISO, VDA 6.1, TQM Systems) 
c. Technology upgrade, automation, CNC 
d. Statistical Process Control (SPC) 
 
7) What other indigenous industries have benefited from the presence of the VWM 
and global auto parts suppliers in the Cluster VWM? 
 
8) Does your company have indigenous suppliers within the Cluster VWM? Or 
outside? Proportion with foreign owned suppliers? 
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9) Can you describe some characteristics of one of your indigenous suppliers, in 
terms of: 
 
a. Certifications 
b. Technology, know-how 
c. Just-in-time or TQM systems 
d. Capability  
 
10) What are the main obstacles for the indigenous suppliers, to become your 
suppliers? 
 
11) How would you explain the benefits of being inside a cluster? 
a. Learning 
b. Cooperation 
c. Trade associations 
d. Research institutions 
e. Sources of competitive suppliers 
f. Availability of engineers and skill technicians  
g. Other advantages 
 
12) In the next five years, does your company have plans to increase the number of 
local suppliers? 
a. Any program to develop local suppliers? 
 
Two final general questions 
 
13) What are the future challenges for Mexican suppliers to move to the next level of 
competitiveness? 
 
a. Skills and managerial practices 
b. Technology, know how 
c. Capital, credit 
d. Infrastructure 
 
14) Are there any other questions that I should ask you about the auto parts industry 
to better understand the obstacles or dynamics for the competitiveness of the 
industry? 
 
 
Æ Can I contact you again in case I want to clarify some of the information that you 
provide me in this interview? 
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 Appendix 5: Mexico's Share of Total World Exports, Selected Industries 
 
Exports from Mexico to the World (US dollars)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
7812 2,614,143,488 3,784,360,704 3,368,307,968 4,242,480,896 5,050,844,160 7,521,751,040 9,672,988,672 9,700,077,568
7821 21,997,752 163,561,696 586,838,976 669,201,024 817,075,968 1,850,104,064 3,422,247,168 3,985,018,880
784 416,801,088 490,836,160 1,602,836,992 2,013,789,056 2,307,452,416 2,498,895,104 2,976,076,800 3,462,084,608
Total Exports from the World
1,990 1,991 1,992 1,993 1,994 1,995 1,996 1,997
7812 166,440,232,960 170,276,546,560 190,613,056,512 184,555,937,792 205,799,214,080 230,745,631,744 245,737,779,200 259,044,429,824
7821 31,891,530,496 33,300,627,200 36,000,192,384 33,394,127,744 37,627,841,664 41,260,690,688 44,987,617,536 50,192,756,736
784 79,610,080,256 79,413,854,720 91,976,744,960 82,223,500,288 97,215,917,568 112,290,806,272 117,831,558,656 123,013,334,016
Mexico's Share of Total World Exports
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
7812 Cars 1.57% 2.22% 1.77% 2.30% 2.45% 3.26% 3.94% 3.74%
7821
Light 
Trucks 0.07% 0.49% 1.63% 2.00% 2.17% 4.48% 7.61% 7.94%
784 Autoparts 0.52% 0.62% 1.74% 2.45% 2.37% 2.23% 2.53% 2.81%
Source : Based on United Nations Statistics Division Data, retrieved June 10, 2005 from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/  
 
Exports from Mexico to the World (US dollars)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
7812 10,974,162,944 12,407,464,960 16,296,729,600 15,297,572,864 13,948,073,984 12,546,163,712
7821 3,577,820,160 4,101,383,936 4,815,561,728 6,447,020,544 6,349,102,080 6,638,888,448
784 4,173,732,864 5,107,855,360 5,812,523,008 5,579,811,840 6,608,496,128 7,009,161,728
Total Exports from the World
1,998 1,999 2,000 2,001 2,002 2,003
7812 276,911,894,528 292,386,629,632 299,876,057,088 306,880,356,352 336,780,550,144 392,066,594,816
7821 49,944,404,992 49,393,860,864 52,824,928,256 52,028,200,448 53,971,780,096 63,296,602,624
784 126,890,417,152 133,851,447,296 142,033,902,592 137,156,492,288 150,671,457,280 178,711,644,160
Mexico's Share of Total World Exports
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
7812 Cars 3.96% 4.24% 5.43% 4.98% 4.14% 3.20%
7821
Light 
Trucks 7.16% 8.30% 9.12% 12.39% 11.76% 10.49%
784 Autoparts 3.29% 3.82% 4.09% 4.07% 4.39% 3.92%
Source : Based on United Nations Statistics Division Data, retrieved June 10, 2005 from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/
 94 
 
Appendix 6: Auto parts (SITC 784) Balance Trade Mexico-World 
 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Exports 416,801,088 490,836,160 1,602,836,992 2,013,789,056 2,307,452,416 2,498,895,104 2,976,076,800 3,462,084,608
Imports 408,827,360 513,329,472 832,660,992 905,054,016 1,342,969,984 3,103,869,952 5,578,850,304 6,638,303,232
Source : Based on United Nations Statistics Division Data. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/  
 
 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Exports 4,173,732,864 5,107,855,360 5,812,523,008 5,579,811,840 6,608,496,128 7,009,161,728
Imports 6,660,192,768 7,908,128,256 10,335,113,216 10,068,454,400 9,813,117,952 9,187,189,760
Source : Based on United Nations Statistics Division Data. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 7: Top Exporters, Cars - SITC 7812 (1993 and 2003) 
 
Rank 
Export 
Value 1993
Country Exports Share of 
Total 
World 
Exports
Rank 
Export 
Value 2003
Country Exports Share of 
Total 
World 
Exports
1 Japan $47,129,690,112 25.5% 1 Germany $91,509,436,000 20.0%
2 Germany $35,458,588,672 19.2% 2 Japan $68,293,226,496 14.9%
3 Canada $19,024,320,512 10.3% 3 Canada $31,174,668,479 6.8%
4 USA $14,824,305,664 8.0% 4 France $30,118,133,760 6.6%
5
Belgium-
Luxembourg $14,214,185,984 7.7% 5 Belgium $24,398,018,560 5.3%
6 France $12,299,039,744 6.7% 6 Spain $22,979,379,759 5.0%
7 Spain $9,883,098,112 5.4% 7 USA $22,385,909,760 4.9%
8 United Kingdom $6,530,148,864 3.5% 8 United Kingdom $18,571,968,301 4.1%
9 Italy $4,627,710,976 2.5% 9 Rep. of Korea $17,534,568,448 3.8%
10 Mexico $4,242,480,896 2.3% 10 Mexico $12,546,163,712 2.7%
11 Rep. of Korea $3,883,984,640 2.1% 11 Italy $8,095,179,257 1.8%
Others $16,322,368,599 8.8% 12 Sweden $6,485,355,008 1.4%
Total Export: $184,555,938,135 100.0% 13 Slovakia $4,027,661,568 0.9%
14 Austria $3,719,198,464 0.8%
Others $95,839,194,213 20.9%
Total Export: $457,678,061,785 100.0%
Source : Author's calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division Data, retrieved June 15, 2005 from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/
1993 2003
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Appendix 8: Top Exporters, Light Trucks - SITC 7821 (1993 and 2003) 
 
Rank 
Export 
Value 1993
Country Exports Share of 
Total 
World 
Exports
Rank 
Export 
Value 2003
Country Exports Share of 
Total 
World 
Exports
1 Japan $8,917,170,176 26.7% 1 Canada $9,135,187,245 13.3%
2 Canada $7,672,599,040 23.0% 2 USA $7,282,280,960 10.6%
3 USA $3,264,491,264 9.8% 3 Germany $7,229,693,000 10.5%
4 Germany $2,898,029,056 8.7% 4 Japan $6,679,833,088 9.7%
5 United Kingdom $1,311,044,736 3.9% 5 Mexico $6,638,888,448 9.6%
6 Italy $1,177,999,360 3.5% 6 France $3,714,265,600 5.4%
7 Sweden $1,177,190,016 3.5% 7 Spain $3,597,303,752 5.2%
8 France $1,129,865,728 3.4% 8 Italy $3,029,894,958 4.4%
9
Belgium-
Luxembourg $932,344,576 2.8% 9 Belgium $2,736,427,520 4.0%
10 Spain $694,563,200 2.1% Others $18,831,867,318 27.3%
11 Mexico $669,201,024 2.0% Total Export: $68,875,641,889 100.0%
12 Brazil $493,545,184 1.5%
13 Austria $473,851,616 1.4%
14 Netherlands $461,050,240 1.4%
15
China, Hong Kong 
SAR $367,945,312 1.1%
Others $1,753,237,525 5.3%
Total Export: $33,394,128,053 100.0%
Source : Author's calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division Data, retrieved June 15, 2005 from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/
1993 2003
 
 
 
Appendix 9: Top Exporters, Auto parts - SITC 784 (1993 and 2003) 
 
Rank 
Export 
Value 1993
Country Exports Share of 
Total 
World 
Exports
Rank 
Export 
Value 2003
Country Exports Share of 
Total 
World 
Exports
1 USA $19,710,967,808 24.0% 1 USA $28,326,993,920 15.9%
2 Japan $15,326,025,728 18.6% 2 Germany $25,694,467,000 14.4%
3 France $7,929,907,712 9.6% 3 Japan $20,204,279,808 11.3%
4 Germany $7,783,051,776 9.5% 4 France $14,099,529,728 7.9%
5 Canada $6,984,554,496 8.5% 5 Canada $12,141,076,820 6.8%
6 Italy $3,878,584,064 4.7% 6 Italy $9,818,822,796 5.5%
7 United Kingdom $3,636,550,400 4.4% 7 Spain $8,979,456,503 5.0%
8 Spain $2,284,557,824 2.8% 8 Mexico $7,009,161,728 3.9%
9 Mexico $2,013,789,056 2.4% 9 United Kingdom $6,984,717,903 3.9%
10 Sweden $1,850,709,120 2.3% Others $52,439,562,590 29.3%
Others $10,824,802,277 13.2% Total Export: $178,713,350,893 100%
Total Export: $82,223,500,261 100.0%
1993 2003
Source : Author's calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division Data, retrieved June 15, 2005 from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/
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Appendix 10: Mexico's Vehicles Production, Domestic, Imports, and Exports (1990-
2003) 
(thousands of units)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Production 803.7 960.9 1051.2 1055.2 1,097.4 931.2 1,211.3 1,339.3 1,427.6 1,493.7 1,889.5 1,817.8 1,774.4 1,540.6
Production 
Domestic 
Market 526.8 610.2 662.5 583.7 530.3 150.1 235.9 356.3 455.6 420.1 455.4 414.1 448.6 370.4
Imports 5.4 9.4 8.8 8.5 74 34.3 80.2 135.1 196.2 245.7 402.7 473 538.1 607.5
Exports 276.9 350.7 388.7 471.5 567 781 975 983 972 1,074 1,434 1,404 1,326 1,170
Source : Mexican Automotive Manufacturers Association (AMIA): www.amia.com.mx  
 
 
 
(Percentage of units produced)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Production 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Production 
Domestic 
Market 66% 64% 63% 55% 48% 16% 19% 27% 32% 28% 24% 23% 25% 24%
Imports 1% 1% 1% 1% 7% 4% 7% 10% 14% 16% 21% 26% 30% 39%
Exports 34% 36% 37% 45% 52% 84% 81% 73% 68% 72% 76% 77% 75% 76%
Source: Mexican Automotive Manufacturers Association (AMIA): www.amia.com.mx (Data on Appendix 10)
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Appendix 11: Sales of Cars to the Final Customer in Mexico 
(in units)
Companies 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
acura 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
audi 0 0 0 195 1,041 1,754 2,392 3,082 3,625 2,866 3,610
bmw 0 258 1,133 1,604 2,059 2,675 4,467 6,116 5,506 4,461 5,059
daimlerchrysl
er 95,383 36,461 54,499 67,319 92,299 90,675 111,755 130,449 115,501 99,949 115,744
ford motor 89,715 41,857 66,048 95,134 110,343 113,879 143,769 160,202 160,483 158,591 177,825
genera
63
l 
motors 113,593 48,002 89,202 143,303 174,900 176,257 216,658 205,726 230,636 217,965 243,748
honda 0 69 1,896 5,971 12,534 18,859 24,482 28,276 30,430 29,016 29,667
jaguar 0 0 0 0 114 253 326 887 1,400 764 659
land rover 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 760 945 760 8
lincoln 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,549 2,7
m benz 689 1,027 1,216 1,152 1,206 2,493 2,887 3,779 3,312 3,313 3,830
m benz vans 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 113 908 2,384
mg rover 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 797 7
mini 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,545 1,801 1,750
mitsubishi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,922 10,6
nissan 129,289 52,401 59,620 93,816 139,518 134,937 173,066 190,537 211,648 214,011 234,853
peugeot 0 0 0 0 0 1,505 3,454 6,139 9,148 13,353 16,308
porsche 0 0 32 20 13 9 9 185 282 347 452
renault 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,150 15,386 18,431 24,091
seat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11,843 25,116 22,130 22,704
smart 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 141 4
toyota 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9,839 23,8
volkswagen 161,261 46,241 51,508 73,632 109,333 123,689 169,111 165,323 159,782 169,235 170,449
volvo 0 0 0 0 0 303 1,399 2,381 2,700 2,721 3,353
Total 589,930 226,316 325,154 482,146 643,360 667,288 853,775 918,835 977,558 977,870 1,095,796
Note: Includes Imported cars
Source:  Author's estimations based on data from Mexican Automotive 
Manufacturers Association (AMIA): www.amia.com.mx
00
46
75
47
03
76
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Appendix 12: Cars Sales in Mexico, By Region 
(in units)
Origin 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Asian 129,289 52,470 61,516 99,787 152,052 153,796 197,548 218,813 242,078 256,788 299,106
European 161,950 47,526 53,889 76,603 113,652 132,428 183,719 201,998 226,515 239,707 254,393
North American 298,691 126,320 209,749 305,756 377,656 381,064 472,508 498,024 508,965 481,375 542,297
Total 589,930 226,316 325,154 482,146 643,360 667,288 853,775 918,835 977,558 977,870 1,095,796
Source:  Author's calculations based on data from Mexican Automotive Manufacturers Association (AMIA): www.amia.com.mx
Note: Includes Imported cars  
 
Appendix 13: Main Tier 1 Suppliers in Mexico, NORTH WEST 
BAJA CALIFORNIA PARKER HANNIFIN SONORA
AMERICAN EAGLE WHEEL PILKINGTON ALLIED SIGNAL
AMERICAN RACING PIONEER AMER MEX PRODUCTS
ATC DISTRIBUTION GROUP PRIME ATRONICS
AUTOLIV QUALITY POLISHING INT. BENTELER
BOSCH THE BUDD COMPANY BREED TECHNOLOGIES
COTO TECHNOLOGIES THOMSON INDUSTRIES CHAHTA ENTERPRISE
COVERCRAFT INDUSTRIES TT ELECTRONICS CHARLES E. GILLMAN
ECO-AIR PRODUCTION VISHAY ELECTRONICS DELPHI AUTOMOTIVE
ENERGY LABS WABASH TECHNOLOGIES EXEMPLAR MANUFACTURING
FURUKAWA ELECTRIC WATKINS MANUFACTURING HYDRO NORTH AMERICA
GONHER ITT INDUSTRIES
HIKAM ELECTRONICA SINALOA LEONI WYRING SYSTEMS
HONEYWELL SELMEC MOLEX
HOOKER INDUSTRIES SUMITOMO NOMA AUTOMOTIVE
HYUNDAI TRANSLEAD DELPHI OXFORD AUTOMOTIVE
INTERNATIONAL RECTIFIERS WALBRO ENGINE MANAGEMENT PRESTOLITE WIRE CORP.
ISOCLIMA AMERICA MEXICORVOS ST. CLAIR TECHNOLOGIES
KAMITA INTERNATIONAL TAKATA
KYOCERA DURANGO THE INTEC GROUP
LEVITON ELECTRIC DE DURANGO (GRUPO ARMAS) TRW
MANIK MOTORS LINAMAR TSE BRAKES
MARKO FOAM PRODUCTS SUMITOMO TYCO ELECTRONICS
MATSUSHITA-AROMAT YAZAKI NORTH AMERICA VELCRO
MORGAN POLIMER SEALS WALBRO (TI AUTOMOTIVE)
NKS SAFETY TECHNOLOGY YAZAKI
Source: Suarez, R.(2004). The Automotive Parts Industry . INA  
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Appendix 14: Main Tier 1 Suppliers in Mexico, NORTH EAST 
COAHUILA ARVIN MERITOR CAPSONIC AUTOMOTIVE DELPHI ALAMBRADOS AUTOM.
A.O. SMITH AUTOCLIMAS CARLISLE EATON
ALCOA FUJIKURA AUTOM. WIRE HARNESSES COILCRAFT FERMAG
ALLIED SIGNAL-HONEYWELL CAMISA COOPER INDUSTRIES FUJITSU TEN
AUTOTEK INDUSTRIAL DE MEX. CARPLASTIC CRONI GLOBE MOTORS
BENTELER CARUSI CUMMINS DIESEL GODAM
BROWN CORPORATION CATERPILLAR DANA CORP. GSW MANUFACTURING
CASTECH CNW DELMEX DE JUAREZ HAYES LEMMERZ INT.
CATERPILLAR DANA DELPHI INVENSYS
CIFUNSA DELPHI EAGLE OTTAWA ITT AUTOMOTIVE
CITATION TOOLS DENSO EATON KIMKO
CNI, INC. DONNELY ELECTRISOLA KONGS BERG AUTOMOTIVE
COOPER STANDARD ENERTEC MEXICO FEDERAL MOGUL MATSUSHITA ELECTRONIC COMP.
DELPHI DIESEL SYSTEMS GE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER MIKUNI TEXAS
DOUGLAS & LOMASON GONHER HAYES WHEELS ALUMINIO MINNESOTA RUBBER
FEDERAL MOGUL GOODMANS HOMELITE MODINE 
FINDLAY INDUSTRIES GOODYEAR HONEYWELL NAFTEK
FLAMBEAU PLASTICS GUNTNER I.T.E.S.A. PARKER HANNIFIN
FOAMEX CORPORATION HAYES LEMMERZ INT. ITT AUTOMOTIVE PRECISION CABLE MANUF.
GENERAL DE CABLE MEX. HOLLANDER JOHNSON CONTROLS PULLMEX
GM PROCESSING HUSSMAN KENWOOD SAINT-GOBAIN 
IRVIN AUTOMOTIVE JOHN DEERE KEY PLASTICS SIEMENS
JOHN DEERE KEY PLASTICS LEAR CORPORATION STANDARD MOTOR PRODUCTS
JOHNSON CONTROLS LEAR CORP. LEONI CABLE TELEFLEX
KAY AUTOMOTIVE LORD CORP. LETTS INDUSTRIES TENNECO AUTOMOTIVE 
LAGERMEX METALSA MANESA TI AUTOMOTIVE
LEAR SEATING MITSUBA MORAINE TROSTEL
LINAMAR MITSUBISHI NICHIRIN COUPLER TRW ELECTRONICA ENSAMBLES 
MAGNA INTERNATIONAL MOTO REDUCTORES US ROBERT BOSCH TRW VEHICLE SAFETY SYSTEMS 
MAGNA SEATING SYSTEMS NEMAK SATURN ELECTRONICS UNIROYAL CHEMICAL
MAHLE PISTONES PARKER ZENITH SETON UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
MANNESMANN-SACHS AG PIOLAX SHELDAHL TECHNOLOGIES VALEO
MASCO TECH PIONEER SIEMENS VALEO SYLVANIA
METALDYNE SIEMENS SSI TECHNOLOGIES, INC. VELVAC
OXFORD AUTOMOTIVE SUMITOMO STONERIDGE VISTEON
PILOT INDUSTRIES TAKANISHI STRATTEC SECURITY WELLS MANUFACTURING
PLASTIC OMNIUM TAKATA SUMITOMO
PSA WIRING PRODUCTS TAPEX SUPERIOR INDUSTRIES
SAN LUIS RASINNI TEKNIK TDK USA CORP.
TAKATA THOMAS & BETTS TRW OCCUPANT RESTRAINTS
TECHNOTRIM THOMAS BUILT BUSES TRW STEERING WHEELS SYST.
TENN-MEX TI AUTOMOTIVE TYCO INTERNATIONAL
TEXTRON AUTOMOTIVE TOKIO ELECTRICA VALEO
TWB TOYOTA TSUSHO VISHAY
VEHYCO VEGE DE MEXICO VISTEON
VISTEON-CARPLASTIC WARNER
NUEVO LEON VITRO YAZAKI NORTH AMERICA
A.O. SMITH CORP.
ABB MEXICO CHIHUAHUA TAMAULIPAS
ACCURIDE A.O. SMITH CORP. ALPINE ELECTRONICS
AISIN SEIKI ALCOA FUJIKURA AMMEX PRODUCTS
ALCOA FUJIKURA AUMA BBB INDUSTRIES
ALLIED SIGNAL AVON AUTOMOTIVE BREED TECHNOLOGIES
AMERICAN WHEELS AVX CORPORATION BRONCO ELECTRONICS
ANCHORLOK BERGEN CABLE CATERPILLAR
ARNECOM BREED TECHNOLOGIES DELCO
Source: Suarez, R.(2004). The Automotive Parts Industry . INA  
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Appendix 15: Main Tier 1 Suppliers in Mexico, CENTRAL EAST and SOUTH 
ESTADO DE MEXICO DISTRITO FEDERAL HIDALGO KAUTEX TEXTRON
ABB MEXICO ASSOCIATED SPRING CITSA PPG KIEKERT DE MEXICO
ANSORGE BOCAR CORTINAS Y PARASOLES AUTOMOTRICES LAGERMEX
AUTOSEAT BOSCH ENGRANES DE HIDALGO LUK
BARDAHL CALSONIC
GLOBAL TRANSPORTE, INDUSTRIA 
SERVICIO PARKER HANNIFIN
BASF EATON
INDUSTRIA MANUFACTURERA DE 
REFACCIONES PLASTIC OMNIUM
BOSCH FIRESTONE INDUSTRIAL DE PARTES PACHUCA SIEMENS
CLEVITE GONHER INDUSTRIAL SAHAGUN SKF
CRISTALES INASTILLABLES DE MEX. GOODYEAR-OXO INDUSTRIALES EN FIBRA DE VIDRIO
SOMMER ALLIBERT INDUSTRIES DE 
MEX.
DANA HEAVY AXLES HITCHINER MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIAS RAVIC TENNECO
EAN SA MANN HUMMEL MANUFACTURERAS AUTOELECTRICAS THYSSENKRUPP METALURGICA
EATON METALDYNE MANUFACTURAS G THYSSENKRUPP PRESTA
ECHLIN MICHELIN CORPORATION MAENA TRW SISTEMAS DE DIRECCIONES
FEDERAL MOGUL MODINE/MEXPAR
FPA MORESA INDUSTRIAL TLAXCALA
GABRIEL DE MEXICO NAL. DE CONDUCTORES ARCOMEX
GATES RUBBER VITRO AUNDE TEXEL
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CONDUMEX
HAYES LEMMERZ MORELOS EMPRESAS CA-LE DE TLAXCALA
HAYES WHEELS ACERO BERU EUWE EUGEN WEXLER
HELLA KG HUECK & CO. BRIDGESTONE FORJAS SPICER
HENKEL KGAA FIRESTONE GRAMMER AUTOMOTIVE
INDUSTRIAS TAMER FREUDENBERG-NOK DE MEX. IDEAL ESTÁNDAR
KRUPP HOESCH SAINT-GOBAIN SEKURIT JOHNSON CONTROLS
LEAR CORPORATION TEMIC KEIPER
LIBERTY MEXICANA SAINT-GOBAIN
LORD DE MEXICO VERACRUZ VMS FLOCKTECHNICK DE MEX.
MAGNA INTERNATIONAL AVON RUBBER P.L.C.
PARKER HANNIFIN SIEMENS PUEBLA
PERKINGS INDUSTRIES TAMSA AUTOCRISTALES DE ORIENTE
SARNAMOTIVE BLUE WATER AUTOTEK
SEALED POWER MEXICANA CHIAPAS BENTELER
SKD DE MEXICO AXA YAZAKI BREMBO RASSINI
TI AUTOMOTIVE YUCATAN FEDERAL MOGUL
TRELLEBORG YSH AIR SYSTEM FTE MEXICANA
VALEO SYLVANIA AIR TEMP HP PELEZER AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS
ZF HOLDING AXA YAZAKI JOHNSON CONTROLS
Source: Suarez, R.(2004). The Automotive Parts Industry . INA  
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Appendix 16: Main Tier 1 Suppliers in Mexico, CENTRAL WEST COAST 
AGUASCALIENTES DANA HOSE & TUBING QUERETARO TREMEC
BOSCH DANA LONG MANUFACTURING ABC GROUP-CANADA TRW SISTEMAS DE DIRECCIONES
BUSSCAR DELCO REMY COMPONENTS AMERICAN CAR EQUIPMENT VALEO MATERIALES DE FRICCION
CALSONIC DELCO REMY REMANUFACTURING ARNESES ELECTRICOS AUTOM. VAN ROB STAMPINGS
COOPER STANDARD EAGLE-PICTURE INDUSTRIES ARVIN DE MEXICO VISTEON CLIMATE SYSTEMS
COROPLAST EATON ASPERMEX WOCO
FORJAS Y MAQUINAS EDSCHA AUMA-TEC
FRENADOS MEXICANOS INDUSTRIAL BLAJU AUTOLIV GUANAJUATO
GESTAMP ROBERT BOSCH AUTOPARTES WALKER AMERICAN AXLE
INDUSTRIA DE ASIENTO SUP. THYSSENKRUPP SASA BROSE ARBOMEX
JATCO VALEO SISTEMAS ELECTRICOS BTICINO DE MEXICO ARNESES ELECTRICOS AUTOM.
K & S MEXICANA VALEO TERMICO BYPASA (SAN LUIS RASSINI) AUTOENSAMBLES Y LOGISTICAS
KANTUS CLARION AUTOLOG
MARCOPOLO JALISCO COLLINS & AIKMAN GROUP AVENTEC
MORESTANA AP TECNOGLASS DE MEX. CORDAFLEX BADER
MOTO DIESEL AUTOPARTES ATR DANA CORPORATION CELAY
NABCO MEXICANA BORGWARNER MORSE TEC MEX. DELBAR PRODUCTS ENERTEC MEXICO
OYAMSA CARBU-PARTS DELPHI FERRANTI PACKARD
POLO MEX CAUSAMEX DURA AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS FLEX N GATE
RESORTES MONTICELLO CR MEXICANA EATON GKN PLC
SANOH INDUSTRIAL EQUIPO AUTOMOTRIZ HELLA FORJAS SPICER GRUPO ANTOLIN
SEALED POWER MEXICANA GRUPO FERRAU FRENOS Y MECANISMOS HUTCHINSON
SIEMENS INDUSTRIAS DE ASIENTO SUP. GRAMMER INDUSTRIAL KASAI
UNIPRES MEXICANA JABIL CIRCUIT DE MEXICO GUARDIAN INDUSTRIES LAGERMEX
YOROZU K & S WIRE HARNESS HARADA INDUSTRIES LEAR CORPORATION
MODINE/MEXPAR HBA CAST PRODUCTS MERIDIAN
ZACATECAS PIONEER STANDARD HI-LEX MORESA (UNIKO)
AXA YAZAKI ROCKWELL AUTOMOTIVE INTERIORES PRINCE (JCI) OXFORD AUTOMOTIVE
DELPHI CABLEADOS ROLAMEX IRIZAR POLIMEROS Y DERIVADOS
ORO CONTROL S & Z ROLMEX JOHNSON MATTHEY TENNECO AUTOMOTIVE
SAARGUMMI K.S.B. MEXICO US MANUFACTURING
SAN LUIS POTOSI SACHS BOGE KOSTAL VELCON
A. SHULMAN SIEMENS VDO MAGNA MIRROW SYSTEMS DE MEX.
ALFRED ENGELMANN DE MEXICO SUMIDA MERITOR MEXICANA
ARVIN MERITOR SUNNINGDALE NEW HOLLAND
CONTINENTAL AG SUPER DIESEL NIHON PLAST
CONTITECH TAKATA NORANDA
CUMMINS DIESEL TECNOPARTS OMNI MANUFACTURING
VOGT ELECTRONICS PPG INDUSTRIES
WEBB DE MEXICO ROCKWELL
YAMAVER SIEMENS
Source: Suarez, R.(2004). The Automotive Parts Industry . INA  
 
Appendix 17: Annual Average Remuneration in the Auto Assembly, Auto Parts, 
and Manufacturing Industries, in Mexico (1994-2003) 
(In Current Mexican Pesos)
Industry 1994 /3 1995 /1 1996 /1 1997 /1 1998 /2 1999 /2 2000 /2 2001 /2 2002 /2 2003 /2
Manufacture 
Industry 26,722 31,372 38,515 46,223 55,135 65,062 75,874 85,400 92,530 97,650
Growth % 17.4% 22.8% 20.0% 19.3% 18.0% 16.6% 12.6% 8.3% 5.5%
Automobile Industry 57,935 65,119 72,587 92,018 109,896 129,036 155,195 176,081 182,035 189,605
Growth % 12.4% 11.5% 26.8% 19.4% 17.4% 20.3% 13.5% 3.4% 4.2%
Auto Parts Industry 27,375 32,193 40,891 49,110 57,839 69,741 82,154 93,039 100,522 100,848
Growth % 17.6% 27.0% 20.1% 17.8% 20.6% 17.8% 13.2% 8.0% 0.3%
Inflation Rate /5 7.05% 51.97% 27.70% 15.72% 18.61% 12.32% 8.96% 4.40% 5.70% 3.98%
/3 Based on Variation Percentage from: INEGI (2002). Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de México: Cuentas de bienes y servicios 1995-2000. Vol. I. Aguascalientes: Author.
/4 Author's calculations
/5 Source:  Banco de Mexico www.banxico.org.mx
/1 Source : INEGI (2002). Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de México: Cuentas de bienes y servicios 1995-2000. Vol. I. Aguascalientes: Author.
/2 Source : INEGI (2005). Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de México: Cuentas de bienes y servicios 1998-2003. Vol. I. Aguascalientes: Author.
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